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ABSTRACT 
Disagreement continues over events that resulted from the country’s largest and most 
controversial natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Casualties due to poor evacuation 
procedures and inconsistent responses in search and rescue have been examined in the 
media and academia. Finger pointing trumps constructive discussion. Government 
officials sought to place responsibility at the feet of many including the victims. 
Likewise, others place blame on an ineffective government process that excludes people 
of color. Are government authorities really reaching out to minorities to bridge the gap, 
or are lapses in communication efforts systemic of a larger problem? Shared experiences 
resulting from long-standing discrimination toward minority populations, particularly 
those of African descent, have historically affected their perception of government and its 
concern for their well-being. To quell this perception and add value to the emergency 
preparedness doctrine, a community-based approach emphasizing personal responsibility 
is most effective in bridging the trust gap and building resiliency, which will necessitate 
change in narratives that create the story lines of minority communities to promote social 
force change. The use of “positioning theory” variables will enable this change in both 
individual behavior and actions, and positively impact the next generation’s ability to be 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A PROBLEM SELDOM ACKNOWLEDGED 
When evaluating responses to disasters in the United States, the focus on 
community resiliency is fast becoming an emerging concept. A nationwide concept based 
on the premise that communities ready for disaster will recover faster and face less 
impact is growing significantly and is a trending movement in emergency management. 
Unresolved, however, is how to build that resiliency in communities that lack 
infrastructure, have an inherent distrust of government, or simply will not or cannot 
prepare for disaster. These communities have normally consisted of minority and lower 
income communities that have socioeconomic challenges typically predating natural or 
manmade emergency situations. 
In considering the reasons that lead to these conditions, it is necessary to 
understand that human nature, not intellect, is a significant part of the problem. Many 
underpinnings of the problem do exist; however, proper and relevant communication may 
be the key to breaking down imaginary social barriers that lead to success in developing a 
comprehensive plan for equality in disaster preparedness and response issues. 
Numerous scholars, politicians, and research studies, as well as those immediately 
affected by Hurricane Katrina for example, disagree as to the exact reasons, for or the 
right answers as to what happened during the country’s largest natural disaster. The 
casualties that resulted from poor evacuation procedures and the inconsistent response in 
search and rescue have been presented across all types of media. Amid the devastation, 
millions of Americans sat transfixed in front their televisions, watching the gruesome 
pictures emerging from the tragic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. They saw people dead 
or dying. They saw many clinging courageously to life on the roofs of their flooded 
homes, praying someone would rescue them, while others desperately wading through 
disease-infested water with nothing but the clothes on their backs, seeking refuge 
wherever they could find it. Viewers saw thousands of families, predominantly people of 
color, trapped in the squalor of the New Orleans Superdome. As they watched in 
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astonishment, many Americans asked: How did this tragedy happen? Why did it happen? 
Who or what is responsible? Moreover, how do we make sure it ’does not happen again?1  
Finger pointing has replaced constructive discussion, and those looking to place 
blame have done so both directly and indirectly. Government officials have looked to 
place responsibility at the feet of many including the victims themselves, while those 
most affected have placed the blame on an ineffective government process that does not 
care about people, especially the poor and those of color. In April 2006, the Joint Center 
for Political and Economic Studies, one of the nation’s premier think tanks on issues of 
concern to African-Americans and other communities of color, held a standing room only 
forum in Washington, DC entitled, “Never Again: Themes from a Forum on Disaster 
Preparedness and Post-Katrina Reconstruction” in which public officials, scholars, and 
community advocates discussed ways in which to prevent a repeat of the aftermath of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They identified a number of obstacles to progress, including 
the desire of most people to “play the blame game,” and “dealing with the same 
roadblocks” any time efforts are made to prepare more effectively for disasters. A series 
of lessons learned that emerged from the forum including a change in the role of public 
leadership, an emphasis on preparedness, changes in the disaster alert system, preserving 
the culture of the community, and a “change of heart” in protecting what is most 
vulnerable.2 
The issue of a lack of preparedness and response in minority communities pre-
dates the concerns and issues associated with individual and government preparedness 
efforts relating to Hurricane Katrina and centers on what must be done to change cultural 
perspective and community action to avoid these circumstances. Due to a number of 
previous disasters (Vanport, Oregon 1948, New Orleans 1927, etc.), history has shown 
that minority communities have a severe distrust of government and oftentimes lack the 
resources to prepare adequately and/or evacuate in an emergency.  
                                                 
1 Michael R. Wenger, “No More Katrinas: How Reducing Disparities Can Promote Disaster 
Preparedness,” Joint Center for Policital and Economic Studies, 2008, 1–18. 




Figure 1.   Cycles of Disaster3 
This reoccurring condition raises the question of if those in the emergency 
management field have the capacity to understand the magnitude of the socioeconomic 
issues facing these communities. If the emergency management field fails to seek an 
understanding of the complexity of these challenges, the problems will remain unresolved 
and may potentially surface negatively in event after event in the form of casualties and 
disruption in quality of life issues. The beginning of the solution is determining why the 
conditions in the cycle of disaster occur and prevent them from reoccurring by taking 
positive steps to acknowledge that one emergency management manual does not include 
the specific needs of these communities in times of disaster. The basic understanding of a 
problem is most often the first step to finding a solution. Emergency practitioners must 
realize that there is not a one-size-fits all method of handling this problem and must take 
the necessary steps to design a program that fits those needing service. 
The key steps that will support the emergency management community are 
dialogue, active listening, being inclusive, and learning from the past. The beginning 
point is dialogue. That simple form of communication in which questions are asked and 
answered, and when service is formulated on what is really best, not what is thought to be  
 
                                                 
3 Dennis P. Andrulis, Nadia J. Siddiqui, and Jenna L. Gantner, “Preparing Racially and Ethnically 
Diverse Communities for Public Health Emergencies,” Health Affairs 26, no. 5 (2007): 1269–1279. 
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best. Are government authorities really reaching out to minority communities to bridge 
the gap, or are the lapses in communication efforts symbolic as this Pulitzer Prize wining 
image captured after Katrina?  
 
Louis Jones, eighty-one, right, and Catherine McZeal, sixty-two, left, help each other walk down 
flooded Poydras Street as they went to the Superdome on Thursday, September 1, 2005, days after 
Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans. In the background and appropriately out of focus are 
National Guard Troops seemingly unwilling to help. 
Picture 1. “Tossed Together by Crisis”4 
                                                 
4 Michael Ainsworth, Dallas Morning News, 2005. 
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Listening should also be a primary action and method of gathering information for 
first responders. Steps should be taken at all levels to incorporate community 
participation in action plans and preparation to effectuate change and enhance 
communications. By doing so, officials can achieve the crucial buy in by the stakeholders 
who will invariably criticize and chastise government response in emergencies when they 
are not part of the process, and in particular, the solution. 
A possible solution may be for those in charge to meet those affected half way. 
Dialogue and active listening can pave the way for a deeper understanding of the root 
causes of the problem and create solutions to overcoming the obstacles that have 
previously been present. The hostility and distrust present in major incidents is 
destructive to a community and what a few hours can cause may take many years to fix. 
Low-income people and people of color, largely because they feel that decision makers 
have previously ignored their interests, are reluctant to trust instructions from such 
decision makers on how to respond to an emergency situation.5  
By taking the steps to be inclusive and looking to the past to resolve the issues of 
the future, success can be achieved in overcoming bias that can lead to a destructive path 
and scar a community not only physically but also mentally and emotionally. Disaster 
planning largely has been the province of professional responders, public officials, and 
private sector leaders. They have not considered the unique needs of the most vulnerable, 
because these planners are not themselves aware of these needs, do not fully understand 
them, or simply do not consider them sufficiently important. People who live with these 
needs on a daily basis, clergy and other community leaders who serve them, public 
officials who represent them, and others who understand the situations of the least 
advantaged among us and are advocates for their needs, must be an integral part of the 
team developing emergency response plans. Only then will these plans fully and fairly 
reflect these needs of the community while at the same time create a level of ownership 
of the plan.6 
                                                 
5 Wenger, “No More Katrinas: How Reducing Disparities Can Promote Disaster Preparedness,” 1–18. 
6 Ibid. 
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B. THE STARTING POINT 
George Bush doesn’t care about black people7  
This brief but powerful sentence resonated in the African-American community 
and brought shock and disbelief to others. Among the few not shocked were scholars and 
activists in the field of environmental justice (EJ) who observed the disturbing images 
from Hurricane Katrina splashing across television screens. EJ is defined as the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, sex, 
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.8 Researchers, who study 
chronic risk, generally find that lower-income minority communities, like those of New 
Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, are disproportionately exposed to hazards and other 
disamenities.9 As a result of these conditions, the primary issue addressed in this paper 
will focus on “Preparing Minority Populations for Emergencies: Connecting to Build a 
More Resilient Community.” 
Shared experiences resulting from long-standing discrimination and racism 
toward people of African descent over the past centuries have affected their perception of 
government integrity and concern for their well-being in their often-segregated 
communities in the Deep South. Their racial identity has signified their in-group 
solidarity and empowerment and is essentially important for survival in a hazardous 
environment, such as occurs in natural disasters,10 which is thought to be caused by the 
inequality of the EJ that has not reached into the areas of emergency management and 
preparedness. Vulnerability for minority residents exists to the degree that their 
communities and institutions are isolated from or at odds with the government 
                                                 
7 Lisa de Moraes, “Kanye West's Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC,” The Washington Post, 
September 3, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090300165.html. 
8 Manuel Pastor, In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina (New York: 
The Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 1–60. 
9 Pastor, In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina, 1–60. 
10 Amy L. Ai, Carol Plummer, Grace Heo, Catherine M. Lemieux, Cassandra E. Simon, Patricia 
Taylor, and Valire Carr Copeland, “Racial Identity-Related Differential Attributions of Inadequate 
Responses to Hurricane Katrina: A Social Identity Perspective,” Race and Social Problems 3 (March 
2011): 13–24. 
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organizations and agencies responsible for emergency planning and response. Conflicts 
between communities and governmental and non-governmental agencies, distrust of law 
enforcement and the justice system, and social and political isolation are among the 
barriers that impair the ability of some minority communities to withstand natural or 
manmade disasters.11 Contributing to these vulnerabilities are factors, such as language, 
housing patterns, building construction, and cultural insensitivities, by the general public, 
as well as those servicing the needs of the affected community.12 Trust issues among 
low-income populations are barriers to traditional risk communication systems and limit 
the effectiveness in reducing factors that lead to an unstable information environment.13 
The EJ movement has advocated a broad definition of the environment as the 
place “where we live, work, and play,” and thus, considers not only the allocation of 
costs but also the distribution of benefits. Environmental inequities by race and income 
seem to be an established part of the American urban landscape, and in disasters, can 
create what might be termed as “acute risks” that, like the chronic risks targeted by EJ 
analysis, are often distributed in a way that reflects established divisions of power. This 
uneven distribution of risk may impose heavy and unfair costs on certain populations and 
seem to lead to an overall underinvestment in prevention and preparedness.14 
The problems faced by minority communities are a complex set of issues that are 
compounded when placed together in the context of the “whole problem.” Conflict 
between minority communities and local agencies and governments, particularly 
involving law enforcement, restrict the lines of communication between vulnerable 
populations and those charged with providing emergency relief. Diminished social and 
resource capital for institutions serving minority populations extend to an institutional 
level and correlate between social capital, race and ethnicity. Agencies that serve 
                                                 
11 Toby Moore, “Institutional Barriers to Resilience in Minority Communities,” Institute for Homeland 
Security Solutions, May 2010, 1–8. 
12 Xanthia James, Anita Hawkins, and Randy Rowel, “An Assessment of the Cultural Appropriateness 
of Emergency Preparedness Communication for Low Income Minorities,” Journal of Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management 4, no. 3, art. 13 (2007): 1–26. 
13 Randy Rowel et al., “A Guide to Enhance Grassroots Risk Commuications Among Low-Income 
Populations,” Health Promotion Practice 13, no. 1 (July 2011): 124–132. 
14 Pastor, In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina, 1–60. 
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predominantly minority communities may lack the capacity of their better-funded 
counterparts, which creates an inherent conflict reinforcing the “haves” and “have-nots” 
philosophy. Isolation can be a source of conflict in these communities in which 
communication breaks down and the community remains in isolation due to these 
barriers. Lastly, poor linkages between levels of bureaucracy, as in cases of poor 
relationships between local and state government agencies, further the problem and can 
lead to an adversarial environment and slow response.15  
These perceptions are not shared by all. For example, Wellington Boone, an 
African-American minister, commented that “the looting and trashing of property speaks 
to the basic character of the people…. who are doing this to themselves.”16 This view 
was further reinforced in the media by the overwhelming number of reports of looting 
involving African-Americans and the cessation of air evacuations due to helicopters 
being shot at by residents in African-American communities.17 These comments 
represent a segment of the population that continues to propagate the belief that minority 
communities are not worthy of assistance because of their own actions. These anecdotal 
examples, however, have not been quantified to actually enable a determination as to 
their validity or that the positive relief efforts in these communities are not appreciated or 
even that the negative behaviors are overwhelmingly pervasive. 
Often, minority populations have an increased risk and vulnerability to natural 
disasters because of having settled where land is less expensive, and is consequentially, 
disproportionately vulnerable to flooding, and in some cases, poor construction. These 
groups also find it more difficult to prepare and recover from a disaster due to lower 
incomes, fewer savings, greater unemployment, less insurance, and less access to 
communication channels and information.18 Barriers, such as financial constraints and 
                                                 
15 Moore, “Institutional Barriers to Resilience in Minority Communities,” 1–8. 
16 Pamela Reed, “From the Freedman’s Bureau to FEMA: A Post-Katrina Historical, Journalistic and 
Lieterary Analysis,” Journal of Black Studies 37, no. 4 (March 2007): 555–567. 
17 Jason Rivera and DeMond Miller, “Continually Neglected: Situating Natrual Disasters in the 
African American Experience,” Journal of Black Studies 37, no.4 (2007): 502–522. 
18 James, Hawkins, and Rowell, “An Assessment of the Cultural Appropriateness of Emergency 
Preparedness Communication for Low Income Minorities,” 1–26. 
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fear of crime and violence upon leaving one’s property, are also important issues when 
addressing preparedness and evacuation in these communities.19 Literature related to 
assessing the cultural sensitivity and appropriateness of risk communication materials and 
resources in the African-American community and other communities of color appears to 
be insufficient. A review of related literature found no assessments of the accessibility 
and readability of emergency preparedness materials for African-Americans, which is 
imperative to conducting an accurate assessment of the cultural appropriateness of 
written materials to ensure the proper message, is being relayed, and more importantly, 
understood.20 
                                                 
19 Keith Elder et al., “African-Americans’ Decisions Not to Evacuate New Orleans Before Huricane 
Katrina: A Qualitative Study,” American Journal of Public Health 97, no. S1 (2007): 5124–5129. 
20 James, Hawkins, and Rowell, “An Assessment of the Cultural Appropriateness of Emergency 
Preparedness Communication for Low Income Minorities,” 1–26. 
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Figure 2.   The Whole Problem 
A prerequisite for community disaster preparedness according to Reilly Morse, 
“is to gather and record the basic history that created their community and the sequence 
of events that has led to health and environmental conflicts.”21 Understanding this history 
recognizes the uniqueness of each community and can help to inform disaster-planning 
decisions, suggest coalitions of organizations and communities with common interests, 
and guide future development decisions so that the impacts of future disasters are both 
                                                 
21 Riley Morse, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina,” Joint Center for 
Political and Economic Studies (2008): 7–9. 
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minimized and more equitably felt.22 Connecting to minority communities and socially 
disadvantaged groups by assessing their needs and acknowledging their limitations and 
diversity will add consistency in planning solutions and aid in avoiding variances in plan 
implementation.23 If community members are included in the planning process, they will 
be more aware of the dangers they will confront, will be more likely to respond to 
guidance consistent with the plan because they understand it better, will have greater trust 
in it, and will feel a level of ownership of the plan.24 The process of achieving racial and 
ethnic justice is a pre-condition to establishing the level of trust and understanding to 
bridge local racial and ethnic divisions in communities to ensure an equitable response to 
future disasters. 
Minority and disempowered populations are at great disadvantage in securing 
favorable policy decisions from elected and appointed official bodies through 
conventional processes because political power tends to be asymmetrical.25 In contrast, 
faith-based communities are plentiful and have helped form African-American identity 
based on a sense of deep interconnectedness, and continue to be a meaningful, 
empowering, and resource-laden dimension of life that is a factor in the collective 
capacity of communities.26 Black churches have been largely overlooked in public policy 
disaster management circles despite serving as crucial community-based partners. 
Current disaster and emergency response planning at the local, state and federal level 
illustrates how little understanding there is of the important role churches can play in 
responding to natural or man-made catastrophes, especially in communities of color. 
Helping the “least of these,” the most vulnerable populations, is seen as a biblical 
mandate and which can drive the role of first responder when responding to areas in need 
                                                 
22 Wenger, “No More Katrinas: How Reducing Disparities Can Promote Disaster Preparedness,” 1–
18. 
23 Rivera and Miller, Continually Neglected: Situating Natrual Disasters in the African American 
Experience,” 502–522. 
24 Wenger, “No More Katrinas: How Reducing Disparities Can Promote Disaster Preparedness,” 1–
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25 Morse, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina,” 7–9. 
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consisting of minority populations. Psychologists dealing with survivors of Hurricane 
Katrina acknowledged the level of religiosity and realized how vital the African-
American churches’ role can be in disaster preparedness and response.27 The recruitment 
of religious organizations in the emergency management process will assist in enlisting 
members of the community through trust and rapport building. 
The negativity surrounding emergency preparedness and response in African-
American communities is intertwined with their ability to engage in a trusting 
relationship with officials and magnifies other issues, such as socioeconomics and 
cultural differences. This factor resonates in many members of these communities, and 
unless resolved, can be detrimental to any preparation or recovery effort. Utilizing the 
past to ensure that history does not repeat itself, as well as engaging assessment tools to 
gauge message delivery while enlisting community leaders in the process, can begin to 
diminish the adversarial feelings in these particular communities. President George W. 
Bush stated in 2005, “This poverty has roots in generations of segregation and 
discrimination that closed many doors of opportunity.”28 The factors that led to poor 
response, unreasonable expectations and certain failures can be addressed providing all 
involved participate.  
Enlisting an all-inclusive approach to disaster preparation and response, will help 
ensure that a progressive and effective method of service delivery will be developed. 
Gaining the trust of those who are to be served should be the focal point of the discussion 
and creating a program that emphasizes a bottom-up approach would be the most 
meaningful. Increasing stakeholder input and connectivity will help build capacity in 
these communities and effectuate long-term change that is beneficial to all involved. 
C. AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE 
According to Victoria Jennison, the formation of networks is one of the most 
commonly considered strategies for addressing collective human (community) need in 
                                                 
27 Karyn Trader-Leigh, “Understanding the Role of African-American Churches and Clergy in 
Community Crisis Response,” Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (2008): 1–22. 
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emergencies.29 The actions taken by these networks are a common thread present in 
communities exhibiting well-defined preparedness models and an ability to provide 
immediate response to emergencies. These networks offer a community an opportunity to 
build social capital, which creates collective value and a commitment to work together 
towards a common goal. This social capital facilitates the flow of information, mutual 
aid, and collective action that form the basic foundation for community resiliency, which 
is defined as “the developmental characteristic of a community that functions as a 
protective factor against vulnerability in disaster and for sustainable recovery 
afterwards.”30 These factors contribute to a better-prepared community, which, in turn, 
creates a level of resiliency that leads to less vulnerability for the stakeholders.  
Community capacity building refers to the means by which a community can tap 
its own strengths and abilities rather than being overwhelmed by problems or feelings of 
powerlessness. Capacity building is not likely unless the community has the assets and 
the will to mobilize these assets.31 The ability to build and maintain capacity results in 
community resiliency. Resiliency can be improved via the simple strategy of increasing 
community protective factors (ability to maintain resources) and decreasing risk factors 
before disaster strikes. Increasing resiliency can lessen the infrastructure damage 
communities sustain during disaster and shorten the post-event recovery period. This 
ability to protect and more quickly regain important elements of infrastructure can go a 
long way toward preventing many of the devastating economic, health and social 
problems common in the aftermath of disaster.32 
As illustrated in Figure 3, Kulig’s Community Resiliency Model builds a level of 
trust and respect between the community and local government, and acts as a bonding 
agent for individuals within the community.33 This concept is built on the premise that 
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33 Ibid. 
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the community working together acts and does for the community as a whole, which 
results in action creating a more resilient community that can be utilized as a model both 
pre and post disaster. 
 
Figure 3.   Kulig’s Community Resiliency Model 
Initiation of these efforts to develop networks and increase resiliency in strict top-
down methodology could fail to leverage resources effectively that could be useful and 
perhaps critical in any given emergency operation.34 In Emergency Management (EM), 
little emphasis has been placed on capacity building including human resource 
development and reinvention efforts from a grassroots level. Hurricane Katrina exposed 
numerous deficiencies in the existing national framework for emergency management 
that included specific mistakes that delayed an appropriate federal response. Confusion 
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Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 5, no. 1 (2008): 1–19. 
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accompanied the implementation of the National Response Plan (NRP) by government 
officials, which resulted in key elements of the plan being executed late, ineffectively, or 
not at all,35 which is problematic in that the NRP was created in 2004 as a national plan 
to respond to emergencies, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. EM capacity 
should be built from the ground up by utilizing neighborhood and community-based 
programs, which will increase individual and community responsibility for risk reduction 
and decrease reliance upon state and federal assistance that may not arrive for hours or 
days after an event.36 To achieve this goal, inclusiveness of all group leaders must add 
consistency in coordinating prevention and response strategies and planning solutions 
while aiding in the avoidance of variances in plan implementation.37 Research has shown 
that community members who are active participants in the planning process will be 
more aware of the dangers they will confront, will be more likely to respond to guidance 
consistent with the plan because they understand it better, will have greater trust in it, and 
will feel a level of ownership of the plan.38 
Several key components are required for effective community mobilization to 
occur, which include creating a shared vision, a common understanding of the problem, 
leadership in establishing collaborative partnerships, increased community participation, 
and sustainability.39 A critical element in both community capacity building and 
mobilization is the leadership required to bring the key community players together, to 
capture their imagination, and to energize them to action. Such leadership in community 
capacity building need not come from established hierarchies, but can emerge from the 
community itself. Several studies concluded that response operations by faith-based  
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initiatives and volunteer organizations were much faster and effective compared to the 
federal government’s responses in implementing new programs at the organizational and 
community level.40  
D. EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
It has been recognized that emergency management encompasses more than just 
the management of emergencies and many also argue that more must be done to prevent 
disasters and minimize their impacts.41 Repeated threats of disaster without the 
occurrence of an actual event can cause numbness within a community, which results in 
underestimation and under-preparedness; hence, increased public exposure to imminent 
dangers, which in turn, may lead to additional loss of life and property, and a slower rate 
of recovery.42 A more resilient, connected and engaged community has more social 
capital, i.e., more resources to help withstand or recover from difficult events.43 Building 
capacity is the enhancement of resistance and resilience, which has been previously 
discussed.44  
The research and analysis contained in this paper attempts to define the 
complexities that exist in minority communities and the factors hindering their ability to 
effectively deal with disasters. The concept of creating resilient communities is 
discussed, as well the potential to reduce vulnerabilities because of capacity building. 
Lastly, recommendations are offered that advocate a community-based approach that 
utilizes trusted stakeholders as the most effective method of bridging the trust gap and 
building resiliency in these communities to change the narrative that creates the story 
lines of those in minority communities. This change is presented using “positioning 
                                                 
40 Kapucu, “Planning for Disasters and Responding to Catastrophes: Error of the Third Type in 
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theory,” which enables a change in the behavior and actions of individuals. Additionally, 
by utilizing active children’s programs specifically developed for these communities, it is 
believed that not only the family structure can be positively affected but also the next 
generation will be more prepared.  
 18
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
The effects of disasters strike hardest at communities that are ill prepared or 
equipped to handle the devastating circumstances and long-term aftermath. Minority 
communities have been considered to be especially at risk and multiple factors have been 
present that exacerbate the situation. Research has been conducted that indicates that 
resilient communities can recover easier and be more sustainable when facing these 
situations. By utilizing grassroots efforts and enhanced communication sets based on 
research and assessment, these negative long-term effects can be avoided and mitigated.  
A review of the literature has been conducted to examine the relationship between 
the level of interoperability between groups and service providers and issues involving 
community preparedness in minority areas to determine what if any issues exist, and to 
explore potential solutions to effect a positive change in structure and action. 
B. BEHIND THE PROBLEM: A HISTORY OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES 
AND DISASTER  
Post Civil War racial bias has been a part of the American landscape in many 
forms; inadequate protections, the rise of the Klu Klux Klan, and poor opportunities for 
work have had profound life altering implications in the African-American community. 
Jason Rivera and DeMond Miller describe in detail the impact of natural disasters on this 
segment of the population.45 The authors identify a pattern of overt neglect and an 
ineffective and uncaring response by government officials in treatment of these 
communities. This research begins to lay the groundwork for understanding the 
fundamental foundation of distrust and skepticism that minority populations inherently 
have towards the government and its processes. Rivera and DeMond construct their 
argument with examples of three disasters spanning 78 years. 
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In 1927, a massive flood occurred in New Orleans wherein African-Americans 
were only given supplies and provisions after first being provided to white citizens. In 
isolated cases, even animals were rescued from devastated areas before any consideration 
was given to black settlers.46 To save the city, a radical plan was developed where 39 
tons of dynamite was used to blow up a levee and release the floodwaters into a 
marshland area inhabited largely by African-Americans. Evacuations were conducted; 
however, casualties and devastation still occurred. Compensation was promised to the 
survivors of the devastated area although records indicate that affected persons received 
on average $274 if anything at all due to the legal process needed to complete claims.47 
In an ironic twist, loose knit allegations by several individuals, most notably Spike Lee, 
were made during Hurricane Katrina, that the levees surrounding the Ninth Ward were 
destroyed to save “other neighborhoods,” which were predominately white.48  
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Picture 2. Blowing the Poydras Levee in 192749  
                                                 
49 Nicholas Mirzoeff, “The Sea and the Land: Biopower and Visuality from Slavery to Katrina,” 
Culture, Theory and Critique 50, no. 2 (2009): 289–305. 
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Picture 3. Displaced Persons from the 1927 Levee Breach50 
Researchers point to errant communication as a poignant example of how the 
African-American community has continued to view the government in a distrustful and 
skeptical light.51 An example occurred in the 1940s. The largest World War II federal 
housing project, Vanport, was constructed just outside the city limits of Portland, Oregon. 
Although segregation was not permitted under federal housing regulations, African-
Americans were placed in housing units so poorly constructed that they were readily 
referred to as “crackerbox houses.” Situated in low-lying, reclaimed swamps, the units 
housed over 18,000 residents. On Sunday, May 30, 1948, residents were advised that they 
were not in imminent danger from an approaching storm and that the housing project was 
safe.52 The next day the levees were breeched, which caused irreparable damage to the 
project and the deaths of 15 residents.  
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When discussing the effects of Hurricane Katrina, the authors bring parallels of 
the previously documented examples together to further illustrate the negative views 
perceived in the African-American community about disaster management. Discussion of 
racial separation, manifestation of biased imagery against African-Americans, and social 
indifference and neglect are the main points of discussion. As evidence of this bias and  
 
indifference, the authors cite U.S. Representative Richard Baker’s comment about New 
Orleans public housing being “cleaned up” by God, as an indicator of the divide present 
in the management of incidents in minority communities.53 
The authors make the claim that these examples represent “zones of sacrifice,” in 
which a segmented population is left to fend for themselves to deal with disaster with 
little or no hope of returning home, which leaves internal displacement as the only option. 
Furthermore, in what is viewed as a tragic irony, the population is perceived to be under 
the care of a government that at times has caused their displacement, which marginalizes 
their ability to enjoy the dignity of being a citizen.54 The examples presented in the piece 
did not present any contrasting views, however. The authors did not seek answers or 
opinions from those who may have viewed the situations differently or could provide an 
explanation of the circumstance. For example, the authors failed to discuss the white 
settlers also victimized by the 1927 flood, and were in fact, housed in the same location 
as African-American evacuees.55 This type of one-sided view raises concern when 
utilizing the document in the research process. Through independent evaluation of their 
claims and a review of the author’s notes and references, assertions appear to have 
validity. Without the opportunity to consider contrasting views, however, a researcher 
must consider other sources to determine if any of these issues could have been mitigated 
with “victim” participation or if issues were present on the part of the affected 
community that contributed to the perceived neglect or indifference.  
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Reilly Morse, a senior attorney with the Biloxi office of Mississippi Center for 
Justice, analyzed historic patterns of environmental racism found in New Orleans and 
coastal Mississippi and the impact these factors had during Hurricane Katrina. Morse also 
provided a summation of the EJ movement, which highlights its relevance to creating 
effective disaster preparedness planning for the future. 
Morse noted that after emancipation and the end of the Civil War, a “classic 
southern” pattern was developed whereby Whites forced African-Americans to reside in 
undesirable areas subjected to frequent flooding, unhealthy air and noise levels, and 
unsanitary water and sewage conditions. These undesirable areas included swamplands at 
the edge of the city, as well as areas adjacent to railway and industrial sites, in addition to 
other projects, such as the construction on the five-mile-long Inner Harbor Navigation 
Canal (the Industrial Canal), which isolated the predominantly Black Lower Ninth Ward 
from the rest of the city.56 
Prior to 1964, discrimination in housing and transportation also shaped settlement 
patterns in New Orleans, coastal Mississippi and throughout the south in general. Public 
housing was segregated and many suburban subdivisions explicitly excluded African-
Americans through deed covenants. When industrial and chemical plants were first built 
along the Gulf Coast in the 1960s, they were often constructed close to predominantly 
Black residential areas in large part due to the affordability of land. The toxic pollution 
and poisonous wastes produced by these plants caused high rates of cancer within the 
adjacent African-American communities.57 
When evaluating the effects of Hurricane Katrina, Morse asserts that minorities 
and the poor bore a disproportionate brunt of the storm’s impacts. Evidence is presented 
to show that the percentage of Katrina’s victims who were African-American, renters, 
poor, and/or unemployed were larger than the representation of these groups nationwide 
and that this pattern recurs in comparisons between heavily damaged and lightly damaged 
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areas in the affected region.58 Racial disparities in storm damage stems from centuries of 
White control over the characteristics of land occupied by African-Americans that often 
consisted of low elevations with high exposure to back-swamp flooding and poor access 
to transportation. These neighborhoods were built around infrastructure, such as railways 
and industrial canals, which increased isolation of these communities. Isolation produced 
by federal housing and transportation policy was disastrous for the 30% of households 
(over 105,000 residents) in Orleans Parish’s flooded areas who lacked access to a car. 
The most striking example of racial disparity in the New Orleans experience of Hurricane 
Katrina is the relative lack of flood damage in what is referred to as the “White Teapot,” 
the modern-day geographic relic of colonial white plantations along the natural levee of 
the Mississippi River. What these neighborhoods shared were high elevations and low 
exposure to riverside nuisances, such as industrial sites, railroads, and wharves, or back-
swamp nuisances, such as floods, mosquitoes, unpaved roads, and dumps.59 
In contrast to Morse’s assertion, Liam Downey wrote in 2007, that a minimal, but 
not overwhelming, correlation existed between hazards and environmental racial 
inequality. The actual results of Morse’s study “contradict the residential segregation and 
income inequality hypotheses.”60 Downey continues, “This does not mean that residential 
segregation plays no role in producing environmental racial inequality. After all, 
environmental racial inequality could not exist if blacks, Hispanics and whites were 
equally represented in all neighborhoods.” His study shows that environmental racial 
inequality exists in most large metropolitan areas, “but it’s not universal and the 
explanation for it is more complex than many people think.” Racial income inequality 
plays a role in shaping environmental racial inequality, although environmental racial 
inequality cannot exist without at least some level of residential segregation. He further  
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states that residential segregation does not necessarily produce environmental racial 
inequality, and may in some cases, place minorities further than Whites from 
environmental hazards.61  
Morse’s article provides an overview of the pre-existing conditions that led to the 
catastrophic events resulting from Hurricane Katrina. His assertions are that these 
conditions are based on race, which resulted in minority communities suffering a fate 
worse than those of white residents who reaped the safety and security of residing in 
locations less susceptible to the floods resulting from the storm. Downey acknowledges 
the inequality of segregation in environmental hazards but states that this is not the 
primary or all encompassing factor leading to negative outcomes in poor communities. 
C. COMMUNITY RESILIENCY: A TOOL TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY 
When discussing the effects of disaster on communities and the response needed 
for resiliency, researchers lean toward the argument that resiliency begins with 
community involvement and action. Two articles by Naim Kapucu, and Victoria 
Jennison, point to creating community capacity as a means to decrease vulnerability and 
minimize the long-term effects of disaster. The articles are similar in many respects as to 
the use of community as a way to create action; however, subtle differences exist. 
According to Kapucu, leadership in building community capacity comes in many 
forms and not necessarily from traditional hierarchical ones. He references research by 
Comfort and Haase that communication processes occur more effectively along a 
diagonal that crosses jurisdictional and sectoral lines than in a standard hierarchical 
format.62 The disaster response network shows the potential for a variety of self-
organizing system that includes a well-designed communications and information 
infrastructure that contributes to achieving that goal. Enabling communities to manage 
their own risk more efficiently and effectively needs to be established as a primary goal 
of disaster risk reduction. Their study indicates that more effective and faster responses in 
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emergencies were received via volunteer organizations and faith based initiatives.63 
These entities are born out of the communities themselves, are more efficient than 
governmental response, share an inherent knowledge of the community’s vulnerabilities, 
and encourage active participation and diverse involvement.  
Kapucu further states that the NRP and National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) are designed to improve local response to disaster operations and contribute to an 
effective partnership between the federal system and local government.64 NIMS was 
designed as a comprehensive, national approach to incident management applicable at all 
jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines that enables agencies to work 
together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of 
incidents. What these tools do not consider however, are the dynamics of the disaster and 
the collective behavior of the responding agencies. Failure to know who is immediately 
responsible for the emergency creates disorganization is tied to the author’s claim that 
emergency management must come from the bottom up, state and local action, to be 
effective. Kapucu asserts that emergency management is additionally enhanced by the 
building of community resiliency wherein a shared vision is created between the 
government and community stakeholders. This vision provides a greater understanding of 
the problem, partnerships become established, and increased community participation 
develops a culture of preparedness among individual citizens, which increases the 
effectiveness of local government. 
Victoria Jennison agrees with Kapucu that community involvement is necessary 
in response to an emergency situation. Her emphasis is on the use of network formation 
as the main element in building a framework for community resiliency.65 She indicates 
that preparation in the form of community mapping, demographic assessment for 
vulnerabilities and resources allocation of entities at a community, state and national 
level before a disaster makes responding to and recovering from an event less 
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devastating.66 The ability to be constructive in this process of using networks must be 
utilized in a manner that prevents disparities and is free of conflict and political agendas. 
These conflicts, as well as funding and logistical issues, influence the politics that impact 
the resiliency of the affected society. When considering this network approach, Jennison 
states that the non-reliance of local resources to prepare for and respond to disasters is 
critical for U.S. disaster policy. The author believes that the local entity that becomes 
overwhelmed by the disaster itself, and the ensuing disconnect between it and other 
resources can be more devastating than the original event.67 For those reasons, the author 
advocates for creating and maintaining an open network in which all agencies equally 
share in the responsibility, which will allow for a more comprehensive response. Reliance 
on these collaborative networks will, in Jenison’s estimation, offer the benefit of 
organization, resource exchange, risk reduction and an improved disaster response 
paradigm.68  
Kapucu’s argument for more community involvement and less reliance on the 
federal government is compelling, and by way of example, has not been validated. 
Whereas Jennison’s concept of network formation has been shown to have failed in many 
situations due to the number of pieces that must come together to create a finely tuned 
program. Jennison states that when all entities work constructively together much can be 
accomplished and community effectiveness is achieved. This situation, however, is 
complicated by the fact that many steps must fall into place to achieve these results in 
contrast to Kapucu’s assertion that a community that exhibits strength, leadership and 
abilities can overcome a feeling of helplessness to become empowered to solve its own 
problems. Additional research examining Kapucu’s claims should be evaluated, including 
the addition of empirical data that correlates community interaction with lessening 
vulnerabilities and resiliency building. 
                                                 




D. MENDING THE PAST AND CREATING RESILIENCY IN MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES 
After reviewing what physical and psychological situations have been created in 
minority communities, as well as looking at the merits of citizen participation in creating 
resilient communities, merging these two areas and creating a solution for the problem 
now becomes the focus. In “Understanding the Role of African-American Churches and 
Clergy in Community Crisis Response” Dr. Karyn Trader-Leigh asserts that little has 
been done to incorporate religious organizations into the emergency planning and 
response process, particularly in communities of color. The author asserts that the 
Association of Black Psychologists provide African-Americans clergy members to 
address mental health issues and be cultural intermediaries not only for individuals but 
also for entire families, as well as in some cases entire congregations.69 In addition, they 
should be “field tested” and a knowledgeable and culturally competent partner if only 
emergency response providers would use them.70 However, the article used as the basis 
of this assertion by the association is broad and provides scant empirical research to 
support this claim. In the words of one reviewer, “the small number of bivariate cross 
tabulations and frequencies do not do justice to the longitudinal data at their disposal.”71  
The author advocates for the use of the clergy and religious organizations to 
reduce the trauma and re-traumatization of victims and survivors of catastrophic events 
and emphasizes their use in response to Hurricane Katrina; however, she indicates this 
effort was never publicized.72 To achieve these goals, Trader-Leigh makes several policy 
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funding these participating churches to ensure their ability to meet the needs of those in 
their communities, and mandate culturally competent disaster response planning as a 
standard of practice.73  
In contrast to Trader-Leigh’s assertions, Pamela Joshi states in her research that 
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, local churches, unaffiliated with any national 
voluntary organization were serving disenfranchised groups stranded in places that 
traditional voluntary organizations, such as the American Red Cross, did not enter. She 
emphasized that the faith-based organizations did receive attention due to the sheer scale 
and speed of their response efforts, which resulted in these organizations being 
recognized in federal policies as being capable of leveraging their positions to assist in 
preparedness and response.74 
An issue needing further evaluation is the ability of these organizations to sustain 
themselves and their willingness to participate if no funding exists. The article addresses 
funding as one of the points of need; however, it acknowledges that at times, it is not 
available and the bureaucratic process to obtain funding is not always conducive to a 
timely award. 
Trader-Leigh fails to address those in low income communities who do not utilize 
faith based organizations (FBOs) or would be reluctant to do so if the government was 
involved. The author provides no alternative to utilizing other community-based sources, 
such as Job Corps, Urban League or other non-profit organizations that could provide 
service in an emergency. For the purposes of addressing all areas of providing service 
and communication, these alternatives need to be evaluated through further research. 
Xanthia James indicates the importance of several factors when determining the 
cultural appropriateness of risk communication materials. These factors include content, 
format, and method of distribution. The readability of documents, which is an indicator of 
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how the material will be received, must be assessed to determine how effective it will be. 
According to the authors, the material needs to correspond to the literacy level of the 
target audience. Studies have shown this level to be at the 6th grade when trying to 
communicate with individuals of low literacy.75 When reviewing literature related to 
emergency management in Maryland, studies found no assessments on the readability of 
documents provided to minority communities have been conducted. A separate study 
showing that 31% of individuals throughout counties in Maryland had not obtained high 
school diplomas would raise the question of individuals being supplied the information 
can actually be read and understood by the target audience, and if an assessment, would 
produce better results.76  
Dissemination of the material is another important strategy that determines how 
efficiently messages will reach a targeted audience. The manner and method of 
dissemination must meet the demands of the audience and appeal to the normal ways in 
which they obtain information. Attempting to force the information through uncommonly 
used media can substantially affect the number of persons receiving the information. To 
achieve success in providing effective, assessment-based information; emergency 
managers need to determine the socially acceptable medium that the targeted audience 
utilizes in daily transactions.  
In a study undertaken at the Morgan State University School of Public Health and 
Policy, results indicated that low income African-Americans were less likely to utilize the 
Internet as an information-seeking mechanism due to a lack of access to computers. 
Participants of this study reported using friends and relatives, television, and radio as 
primary information sources and that less than half (40%) of the participants had access 
to computers. This type of research needs to be further contemplated on a wide-ranging 
scope to assess the manner in which information is best provided when emergency 
managers prepare for information distribution.77 
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A review of Dr. Randy Rowel’s article on risk communication and community 
engagement provides review of the need for understandable emergency preparedness 
information and a direct focus on who should provide it. According to Rowel, poverty 
may influence the low-income populations’ perception of risk, trust in the system, and 
personal motivation to obtain information. These factors, in addition to various other 
contextual situations, usually result in minority populations experiencing serious 
consequences during and after an emergency situation. Rowel suggests that having an 
effective risk communication system designed to address the unique situation that exists 
in low-income communities can prevent the consequences.78 The article promotes the use 
of grassroots organizations, such as faith-based, business, and community-based that 
have ongoing relationships with vulnerable populations. By utilizing this approach, 
public health and emergency management practitioners can communicate more 
effectively with vulnerable populations when built in a systematic manner at the pre-
disaster phase that maximizes the power of the collaboration. In addition, at the imminent 
danger and response stage, grassroots organizations can communicate valid information 
and distribute materials more quickly and effectively, i.e., by providing information about 
the availability of resources to repair their homes or by identifying temporary and 
permanent housing sources. 
Rowel discusses research he conducted in 2007, wherein a content analysis was 
conducted on emergency preparedness risk communication materials collected from the 
26 county and municipal emergency management offices in Maryland to determine their 
appropriateness in reaching low-income African-Americans and Latinos. The results 
illustrated a significant limitation in the amount of culturally tailored information 
available to these populations, and the need for improvement in developing and 
disseminating culturally appropriate emergency risk communications. Failure to do so 
results in their marginalization in all phases of disaster.79 
                                                 




E. GRASSROOTS APPROACH TO DISASTER PLANNING 
A grassroots risk communication system is a partnership that enables emergency 
preparedness officers to involve grassroots organizations and businesses serving low-
income populations to participate in risk communication activities. Risk communication 
in poor and public housing neighborhoods require effective risk consultation with local 
stakeholders trusted by the populations they serve. 
The Grassroots Risk Communication Project for Low-Income Populations (GRC 
Project) provides an overview of its survey findings from the GRC Project, which was 
supported by focus group thematic analysis. Participants’ perceptions of Hurricane 
Katrina disaster relief efforts were primarily negative and emphasized poorly delivered 
disaster-related services due to race (36%) followed by mental health of hurricane 
survivors (35%), failure to evacuate poor people from New Orleans (31%), treatment of 
people by law enforcement after the hurricane (26%), people not being able to come back 
to New Orleans (26%), and physical health of hurricane survivors (21%). More than half 
(52%) of participants felt that both racism and classism were the primary reasons for the 
inadequate provision of emergency management services while 14% felt poor 
management contributed to the failure. The majority of focus group participants indicated 
that lack of money and poverty are factors that hindered Hurricane Katrina victims’ 
ability to prepare and evacuate.80 
After presenting this information that links the use of grass roots organizations to 
the successful communication of emergency material in minority communities, Rowel 
discusses the challenges of a grassroots program, such as sustainability and the 
interaction between the government and these organizations during the three phases of 
disaster. He then outlines how to implement the programs in the following chapters and 
provides examples of material that can be utilized.81  
                                                 




In summary, Rowel makes the connection between local organizations, minority 
communities, and appropriateness of materials very clear. The missing component in his 
research is the actual development of material, which is readable and informative for the 
concerned low-income groups. This gap in the report is significant as the assessment and 
preparation of materials for distribution is as much a key component of the process as the 
local organizations communication process. In reviewing the implementation, the author 
should have included a chapter or synopsis evaluating printed material and its preparation 
and distribution, and thus, create the much-needed tie-in to his formal process. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The information contained in this literature review examines the underlying and 
historical issues present in African-American communities with respect to emergency 
planning and response issues. These literary examples outline the origins of distrust and 
disconnect between service providers and the communities they are attempting to serve. 
The second portion explored the concept of resiliency and the research that demonstrates 
that community involvement at the lowest levels will result in positive outcomes in 
disaster situations. This “bottom-up” approach replaces traditional hierarchical forms 
when information and action is mandated by government sources.  
The last component considered is combining the two concepts of distrust and 
resiliency to create a framework for working toward interconnectivity and a resilient 
community. By looking at methods of assessing material and its distribution, the 
foundation for creating an effective model for minority community resiliency and 
connection can be drawn. 
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III. HURRICANE KATRINA—ONE STORM, MANY PERCEIVED 
INEQUALITIES, WHY? 
They have been trying to find a way to get rid of us. They had to do it in the 
way that wouldn’t—wouldn’t be known that they were trying to do it. . . . 
-Anonymous82 
Considered by most to be the United States’ largest and most costly natural 
disaster, Hurricane Katrina created as much of a storm in terms of uncovering perceived 
racial bias and inequities as it did with the massive floods that covered portions of New 
Orleans. Studies have indicated that the disparities in the treatment of minorities and low-
income residents in evacuation planning, response and recovery are systematic of 
“business as usual” within the construct of emergency management. This chapter 
considers the aspects of both pre- and post-hurricane landfall and the perceptions that 
have led academics to investigate and research perceived racial bias in emergency 
management efforts. The discussion focuses on the actual abilities of minorities and low-
income participants to evacuate, the distrust felt by the individuals needing service, 
opposing views that the perceived racism is “made up,” and lastly, what developments in 
service and support have succeeded since the storm occurred. 
A. THE STORM IS COMING 
Several studies of Katrina evacuees have been conducted to determine the 
mindset of those affected. This research is important in evaluating what can be done 
differently to effectuate change and reach positive outcomes to change perceptions and 
consider factors, such as race and socioeconomics, as criteria in emergency management.  
Many people have stated that they cannot understand how race has anything to do 
with a natural disaster. However, as they explain how the hurricane has nothing to do 
with race, they use language highly charged with racism, which demonstrates how race is 
very much a part of U.S. culture, while color-blind ideology allows discussion of race to 
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be hidden in covert language that appears rational instead of emotional.83 One infamous 
example was former First Lady Barbara Bush’s comment that people in the Astrodome 
“were underprivileged anyway, so this is working out well for them.”84 
The notion that implications and consequences of a disaster affect all members of 
a community equally perpetuates the idea that stratification by socioeconomic status and 
race does not have an effect on damage experienced from such disasters. Damage to 
homes, immediate physical injury, type of temporary housing, and ability to receive 
compensation through insurance and government assistance vary by socioeconomic 
status and affects those from lower socioeconomic status groups the most, which in the 
United States, has ties related to race.85 
This United States operates on the idea that everyone has an equal chance and an 
equal opportunity to succeed in life. Sweeny argues that this cultural argument points to a 
lack of values and hard work as leading to poverty, rather than structural arguments that 
focus on unequal opportunities and access to resources.86 Bonilla-Silva agrees, “Public 
response to Hurricane Katrina revealed reliance on the myth of meritocracy and color-
blind ideology, where individuals are blamed for their circumstances, while structural 
inequalities are not taken into account.”87 Types of color blindness most often used to 
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equality is believed in, but an individual’s success comes from individual values and hard 
work; and 2) minimization of racism, under the assumption that everyone has the same 
opportunities.88 
Research indicates that individuals very confident in being rescued were more 
likely not to evacuate. Results further indicate that not having an evacuation destination 
identified was the most influential factor regarding the likelihood of not making the 
choice to evacuate.89 In his study of hurricane evacuees, Elder determined that a by-
product of not having a destination identified or not having the resources (financial or 
transportation) to get there, was a significant issue facing African-American evacuees 
when interviewed.90 This factor is further verified by research in the findings of a 2005 
national survey of preparedness by Redlener et al., where it was reported that 25% to 
30% of the U.S. population indicate an inability to comply with mandatory evacuation 
orders without some assistance.91  
Additional issues were also identified by the anonymous participants in subtopics 
contained in the survey, such as Optimism About Outcome. One except from this topic 
stated “Course it’s always been that way with us. I have stayed through many storms, 
even through Hurricane Betsy. But the storm would come through; we have our flood and 
get back on track.”92 In the subtopic, Religious Faith and Coping and Lack of Credibility, 
repeated themes also impacted their perception of the hurricane’s severity.93 Further 
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comments focused on factors that emerged as barriers to evacuation, such as 
neighborhood crime and violence, which caused a perception of the need to stay behind 
to protect valuables, and the perception of transportation availability in an evacuation. 
According to one interviewee, “You could not trust the police to protect your stuff. They 
were stealing too.” Another participant stated, “They didn’t get buses into the 
neighborhoods. Buses stayed on the line. But in the other neighborhoods buses went into 
to pick up, the white neighborhoods.”94 Another interview participant was even more 
specific in reference to timing by stating, “At the last minute the mayor said evacuate, but 
he didn’t bring no buses or nothing.”95 
These factors begin the cycle of perception of how these evacuees were different 
and how race may have played a part in their actions and the perception of those entities 
that they should have looked to for service. Participants expressed that historically, state 
and local governments have tolerated obsolete drainage systems and levees bordering the 
lower Ninth Ward where most of the participants resided. These comments led to related 
comments on the government’s lack of concern for the poor, particularly minorities 
located closest to the levees.96 This distrust coincides with a report that African-
Americans have substantially less favorable views and confidence levels in the ability of 
the government to protect the area that they live in (29% for African-Americans, 51% for 
Whites, and 47% for Latinos) and have a greater feeling that their community received 
less than a fair share of money to prepare for future disasters (56% vs. 36% for Blacks 
versus Whites, and 34% for Latinos).97 
The Elder report supports a study by Brodie et al. of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, 
which showed that a combination of poverty and perceptions of racism and inequities 
influenced African-Americans not to evacuate, even after reaching the stage of high 
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threat perception.98 This stance is quite troubling for a number of reasons including the 
belief that half of African-Americans in the United States are poor or near poor,99 and 
hurricane activity is predicted to increase in the coming years in terms of the actual 
number of hurricanes;100 and that the number of category 3 or higher severity events will 
rise.101 In all disaster preparedness plans, federal, state, and local governments should 
emphasize clear and timely evacuation orders, needed resources and their allocation, 
decentralized voucher or cash distribution systems, and culturally sensitive logistic 
planning for facilitating the evacuation of minority, low-income, and underserved 
communities.102 
B. PAST EVACUATION, IS EVERYTHING EQUAL? 
As V. O. Key has suggested, the South is the clearest U.S. example of 
government sanctioning of, and investment in, forms of racial inequality driven by an 
aristocratic and/or elite/corporate order. Slavery and the plantation system, post slavery 
agricultural peonage, the convict lease system; and emerging agribusinesses with their 
low-wage labor, and the globally driven industrial/retail sector, are examples of this 
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social issue that has perpetually existed across the years.103 The rhetoric surrounding the 
unevacuated “refugees” during Hurricane Katrina suggests an alien population that 
deserved no protection under American law.104 This conversation further constructs 
evacuation compliance as a marker of good citizenship, and privileges the protection of 
evacuees’ empty homes over the care of people unable (and in some cases unwilling) to 
evacuate.105 
Of those individuals and families not able to evacuate, were there inequalities? 
Did the government falter in its support of these cities? Many researchers have concluded 
that race and socioeconomic status played a large role in the recovery, and that in many 
respects, lessons have not been applied that could produce change in the future. With 
respect to the actual people affected, researchers have written about these disparities and 
commented on occurrences, such as “pictures of Black people waving flags as they 
waited days on their roof without food and water,” and of Whites “finding” food while 
Black people were “looting.” Sweeney argues that these are indicative of racial 
disparities in this country.106 These indications by the media and the actual people 
affected in and of themselves portray dissimilarity in the treatment of minority victims. 
These outward portrayals by the media further the distrust amongst those needing to be 
served, who in many cases may have the greatest need. Distrust of authorities, among 
numerous other factors, appeared likely to have played a role in New Orleans residents’ 
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72% of New Orleans residents were of minority race or ethnicity and minority groups in 
the United States have a long history of distrusting the medical and public health 
leadership.107  
This distrust of authorities among New Orleans’ impoverished residents in 
particular, is rooted in local history. In 1927, The Great Mississippi Flood was 
threatening to destroy New Orleans, including its crucial downtown regional financial 
institutions. To avert the threat, and in part to stabilize the financial markets, it was 
decided to perform a controlled break of the New Orleans levees, thereby selectively 
flooding poor areas and saving financial institutions.108 This event lives on in the 
memories and oral history of the residents of the deliberately flooded areas.109 The 
process of utilizing the past to ensure events of the future do not repeat themselves is 
evident in this example. Emergency planners should, therefore, be cognizant of the 
historical past and utilize this information to assist them in understanding the population 
they serve while ensuring the same types of issues do not manifest themselves either in 
reality or perception. 
Given the importance of trust in disaster preparedness and communications, 
addressing existing distrust is critical to mounting effective responses in the future.110 
Each of these elements has specific implications for disaster planning and risk 
communication. The level of a community’s distrust will be partially buffered based on 
the extent to which authorities display competency, fairness, empathy, honesty, and 
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openness prior to a disaster.111 The historical depth of fiduciary concerns highlights the 
necessity of improving trust now between public officials and vulnerable communities in 
which distrust may be long-standing and chronic.112 
C. AN OPPOSING VIEW 
A truly deplorable aftermath of Katrina is the far left’s attempts to stir up 
racial divisions and the news media’s fanning of those flames . . . Do 
tornadoes in Kansas have a “racial dimension,” a racial animus? Would the 
Washington Post ever dream up a headline for that? Apparently, America is 
so stacked with racism in the air that it’s in the gale-force winds.113 
Brian Bozell, President of the Media Research Center 
One of the most striking phenomena to emerge in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina has been a stark difference in perceptions of the role that racism has played in the 
disaster and recovery. For some, it is difficult to see events of Katrina “through any prism 
except the racial lens.”114 For others, claims about racism in the context of Katrina are 
“deplorable” acts of hatred mongering for political gain.115  
By the end of 2006, scholarly analyses of the governments’ failed responses to 
Katrina focused on issues identified by Congress and the White House: communications 
breakdowns, information gaps, lack of coordination across agencies, between levels of 
government, between government and the private sector, failure to initiate action, and 
management failures.116 In the Katrina story, the puzzling condition, which was not 
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demonstrated by government authorities, was the bureaucratic lack of initiative at all 
levels. The failure to step outside the rules and act to save lives and to secure those in dire 
need was a missing piece. This pattern is mysterious in light of evidence through 
literature that discretion, on balance, it is an asset rather than a problem in crisis 
situations.117 One scholar (not in public administration) has suggested that in crisis 
situations, bureaucrats often summon the courage to step outside the rules if they receive 
signals from the top that “this must be done.” Very few such signals occurred during 
Katrina. No one sent the message to do what had to be done to save lives and reduce 
misery. “Those just below ... could not assume that their actions would be seen as ‘of 
course’ necessary.” To the contrary, many of the incidents described show just the 
opposite: leaders demonstrating in word and deed that nothing was more important than 
the rules, which left a widespread “default to literalness.”118 This strict adherence to the 
rules was evident when small craft began massing on the edges of the flooded area. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) refused to approve the volunteer 
rescue effort on the grounds that the situation was “unsafe... . ‘No s——,’ muttered a boat 
captain.” Members of the Florida Airboat Association repeatedly called FEMA to find 
out where to deploy. FEMA did not call back.119 In another example of the rules 
hindering performance and where no modifications were considered, Andy Kopplin, 
chief of staff to the Louisiana governor, spent an entire day trying to get the Pentagon to 
release five helicopters sitting idle at Fort Polk. When he finally obtained the last 
required permission at 5:00 p.m., a major at the base told him that by sitting on the 
tarmac all day waiting for orders, the pilots had gone over their permitted flight time.120  
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The tendency for people from oppressed groups to perceive racism in society may 
occur not only because they apply relatively broad definitions of racism, but also because 
they have more knowledge about historically documented incidents of racism. Likewise, 
the tendency for people from dominant groups to perceive relatively little racism may 
occur not only because they apply a narrowed definition, but also because they are less 
aware of historically documented incidents.121 This pattern suggests that rather than 
ignorance or distortion of reality, beliefs about the plausibility of racism in Katrina events 
may be associated with more accurate knowledge of racism in U.S. history. Likewise, 
quick dismissal of claims about racism is not a straightforward indication of greater 
objectivity, but instead may reflect greater ignorance about documented incidents of past 
racism.122 
The specific self-protective motives associated with denial vary. On one hand, 
White Americans’ denial of racism may be motivated by a need to be protected from 
threats to the legitimacy of the status quo or systems of privilege.123 On the other hand, 
Whites may simply be distancing themselves from the perception that they are 
themselves racist. According to research by Sommers and Norton, the most common 
representation of White racism is old-fashioned racism, a label from which people tend to 
demonstrate a self-distancing motive by distancing themselves from the unpleasant 
thoughts and social affiliations particularly related to racism.124 In a study by Unzueta 
and Lowery, Whites were less willing to acknowledge institutionally generated 
disparities as indicators of racism partly because they were trying to minimize their 
perceptions of White privilege.125 
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These resulting by-products form the thought processes that direct attention from 
oppressed group claims about the presence of racism to White American claims about the 
absence of racism. Rather than an unbiased reading of objective reality, the latter claims 
may reflect ideological motivations of White Americans to deny racism, especially as a 
systemic phenomenon embedded in American society.126 
To understand contemporary racial dynamics that led to the post-Katrina social 
disaster, including the broader context that leads to the existence and perpetuation of 
isolated Black and Brown low-income communities like the Lower Ninth Ward across 
the United States, it is necessary to turn attention to Whites’ racial attitudes and 
understandings. Drawing on a concept developed by Forman, it is argued that racial 
apathy is an increasingly central dimension in Whites’ racial attitudes and plays a key 
role in the reproduction of ethno racial inequality. Forman defines racial apathy as 
“indifference toward societal racial and ethnic inequality and lack of engagement with 
race-related social issues.”127 
Individuals express indifference to racial inequality because they view ethno 
racial minorities who experience difficulty as lesser beings than themselves, and 
therefore, as deserving of inferior treatment. As a result, these individuals feel that they 
have little reason to care about the social circumstances of ethno racial minorities.128 
According to Blumer, “feelings of superiority” is an essential element of dominant racial 
groups’ expression of prejudice.129 
A secondary reason for the expression of racial apathy is ignorance about the 
persistent nature of racial and ethnic inequality. The construction of stories about U.S. 
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history that leave out much of the population are not accidental or inadvertent.130 This 
condition of color-blindness allows for the dismissal of any systematic response or plan 
to root out and stem persistent racial inequities. This condition can be viewed through the 
lens of the Whites and well-off residents of and visitors to New Orleans: they know that 
the Lower Ninth Ward is there, they avoid going there, they avoid interacting with the 
people who reside there, and they remain at best abstractly sympathetic, perhaps apathetic 
or collectively indifferent. They view their lives as separate from those who live in these 
other places. They cannot be held responsible for the cumulative effects of past injustices, 
nor for the persistent consequences of ethno racial inequality today, because they do not 
“know” anything about them.131 As it pertains to emergency management and 
preparedness, this type of indifference perforates planning whereby plans are created in a 
manner that symbolizes all persons as equal even though resources and environments are 
drastically different. For this reason, it is necessary to create plans while developing and 
changing behavior models in communities of color in regards to disaster planning so that 
all may be equal. 
It can be argued that because the environment shapes racism over time, teaching 
about the source of racism as those aspects of the environment is more effective than 
teaching about deeply seated biases that reside within the individual. Those biases may 
never be changed; however, through a collective effort, indifference that results in the 
perception of racism can be positively affected to change how Americans look through 
the lens. A sociocultural approach recognizes both the individual’s psychological 
experience and behavior, as well as its social and cultural context in the form of cultural 
ideas and values that in conjunction with status relations, inform institutions and 
everyday practices shaping the individual’s psychological experience and behavior (see 
Figure 4). Inevitably, however, this type of approach is met with some unease.132 
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Figure 4.   Sociocultural Framework for Intergroup Relations133 
One set of motivations for White denial of racism concerns the need for positive 
social identity.134 For White Americans, the perception of racism implies that one is (or 
could be) identified with a group responsible for perpetrating racism, which violates an 
increasingly prevalent normative standard.135 Accordingly, White Americans may be 
motivated to deny the extent of racism to preserve an unprejudiced self-image and a 
positive sense of White or American identity. Consistent with a system justification 
perspective, Whites exposed to video clips arguing that the hurricane Katrina disaster 
response was due to racism displayed greater racial in-group attachment and in-group 
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love compared to Whites exposed to videos conveying that the government’s 
incompetence was to blame for the disaster response. In contrast, Blacks displayed strong 
levels of in-group attachment and in-group love across both video conditions.136 This 
research highlights how insights from social psychology are valuable in understanding 
psychological responses to social justice-related events and should be used as tools to 
educate and improve processes.  
In 2004, Lawrence Bobo conducted a nationwide survey just prior to Hurricane 
Katrina and found that 34% of Whites believed that racial equality had already been 
achieved, which was in contrast to just 6% of Blacks.137 Six years later, a study 
conducted in Jacksonville, Florida, found patterns of racial disparities in income, 
employment, housing, education, and health similar to the national patterns; however, in 
juxtaposition with these figures, the study also found a 32% racial gap among residents in 
beliefs that racism was a problem.138 Specifically, over three fourths of Black residents 
but less than half of White residents surveyed believed that racism had been a problem in 
that city over the past year.  
The response to Hurricane Katrina provides an even more compelling illustration 
of the racial gap in perceptions of racism. Whereas 76% of African-American 
respondents indicated that they believed that the events surrounding Katrina showed that 
racial inequality persists, only 36% of Whites did so (Table 1).139  
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Table 1.   Perceived Racialization of Hurricane Katrina140 
African-Americans across the country have had stronger reactions to the disaster 
in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast than have White Americans. According to the study, 
African-Americans make harsher judgments of the federal government’s response to the 
crisis, perceive the plight of disaster victims in a different light, and feel more 
emotionally connected to what has happened.141 The disaster has had a far more 
significant personal impact on Blacks than Whites. African-Americans are nearly one 
quarter as likely as Whites to exhibit anger in reference to Hurricane Katrina. African-
Americans are also more likely than Whites to report feeling depressed and angry 
because of what has happened in areas affected by the hurricane (Table 2).142 
 
                                                 






Table 2.   Emotional Response to Hurricane Katrina by Race143 
In a 2009 study conducted at Tulane University involving White students, 
participants demonstrated a strong preference for an individualistic conception of racism 
over an institutional conception of racism. This result provides support for the argument 
that White Americans tend to conceptualize racism in terms of individual prejudices 
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Participants were instructed to indicate on a 7-point, Likert-type scale the extent to which they personally 
believed that racism played a role in each event. The possible range of scores was from 0 to 6 with higher scores 
indicating greater perceived racism. The measure showed acceptable reliability (Time 1 α = .81, Time 2 α =.81). 
Table 3.   Item Mean for Perceived Racism in Katrina Related Events145 
This finding builds upon the results of earlier research, which has demonstrated 
that, when provided with examples of potentially racist events, White Americans are less 
likely to perceive racism in institutional examples as compared to more individualistic 
examples.146  
The present research suggests that White Americans are not neutral observers of 
racism but rather that they, like ethnic minorities, have a stake in the answer to the 
question, ‘How much racism is there in American society?’ White Americans’ tendency 
to perceive little racism in Katrina-related events may largely be due to a tendency to 
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racism. Furthermore, these low perceptions of racism may serve to buffer White 
Americans from the negative effects of perceived racism for White American private 
regard.147 
D. BLACK, WHITE AND OTHERS  
While the exploration of the perceptions, and some realities, of both Blacks and 
Whites has been discussed, additional factors influence the existing conditions that are 
prompted by outside sources including the government and media. These entities have a 
meaningful effect on the way in which events are interpreted and based on their actions, 
or lack thereof, and reporting, skew the images being presented, and more importantly, 
the service being provided. 
Administrators in the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA justified their 
lack of emergency aid by claiming that they had not anticipated that “people would loot 
gun stores ... and shoot at police, rescue officials and helicopters.”148 The flood of 
racialized images of a terrorized, crime-engulfed city prompted hundreds of White 
ambulance drivers and emergency personnel to refuse to enter the New Orleans disaster 
zone. Television reports quickly proliferated false reports about “babies in the 
Convention Center who got their throats cut” and “armed hordes” hijacking ambulances 
and trucks.149 Baton Rouge’s Mayor Kip Holden imposed a strict curfew on its facility 
that held evacuees, and warned of possible violence by “New Orleans thugs.”150 That 
none of these sensationalized stories was true hardly mattered. As Matt Welch of the 
online edition of Reason magazine noted, the “deadly bigotry” of the media probably 
helped to “kill Katrina victims.”151 
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Administrative practices can be infected with racism even though individual 
administrators do not bear conscious animus toward people of color. In this respect, 
racism is masked.152 The events of Katrina suggest a need to probe the extent to which, 
and the circumstances under which, personal judgments might be skewed by race bias. In 
this instance, many decided to adhere strictly to bureaucratic rules while others were 
indifferent to claims of inequity. They decided to adhere to strict procedure rather than 
help those in need. In New Orleans, those in need were disproportionately African-
American.153 Shelby argues that a society’s racist beliefs can infiltrate an individual’s 
viewpoint and lead to actions that “perpetuate oppression whether or not they are 
performed with a racist heart.” Beliefs, therefore, can also infect social decision 
making.154 
By way of example, in his history of urban crisis, Thomas Sugrue notes that 20th-
century White Americans widely assumed that African Americans were less intelligent 
than Whites, fit for physical labor, lazy, sexually promiscuous, and prone to dependence. 
These beliefs produced and supported race-based policies and practices in urban renewal, 
welfare, public housing, and government-backed mortgage lending.155 These policy 
makers were not overtly racist; however, the belief systems and stereotypes guided 
policies in certain directions. The concept of masked evil could well be explained in the 
examples of the continual prevalence of Jim Crow laws at all levels of government, and 
in a more individualized example, the withholding of treatment of the Tuskegee airmen to 
study the effects of syphilis. 
According to the Senate committee on Hurricane Katina, the effect of the long-
term failures at every level of government to plan and prepare adequately for a 
catastrophic hurricane in the Gulf was evident in the inadequate preparations before 
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Katrina’s landfall, and then again, in the initial response to the storm.156 Out of the entire 
incident, two success stories involving the Coast Guard and certain private sector 
business were identified as being worthy of note. These entities conducted extensive 
planning and training for disasters, and put that preparation into use when disaster struck. 
Both moved material assets and personnel out of harm’s way as the storm approached, 
but kept them close enough to the front lines for quick response after it passed. Perhaps 
most important, both had empowered front-line leaders able to make decisions when they 
needed to be made.157 While these examples were noteworthy, they occurred because of 
careful planning and with the blessing of the upper echelon, which is in contrast to the 
ideas presented earlier.  
By far, the most inflammatory rhetoric during the event was the sounds and 
images captured and reported by the news media. The power of the media to sway public 
opinion, to polarize “in-groups,” and to sensationalize opinions, greatly influenced the 
perception of those directly impacted by Katrina and the thoughts of observers 
throughout the world. One such example came from the Black conservative ideologue 
John McWhorter, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He ridiculed the accusations 
of racism as nasty, circular, and unprovable, adding, “It’s not a matter of somebody in 
Washington deciding we don’t need to rush [to New Orleans] because they’re all poor 
jungle bunnies anyway.”158 By comparison, Mayor Ray Nagin, while addressing the 
fears of the city’s black inhabitants and speculation about future development in the 
Ninth Ward, received stark criticism for proclaiming, “this city will be a majority 
African-American city. It’s the way that God wants it to be. You can’t have it no other 
way.”159  
For the purposes of this portion of research, one characterization of the media’s 
power of influence can be demonstrated in two photos. Specifically, an Associated Press 
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(AP) photo showed a Black man wading through chest-deep water with grocery store 
merchandise and described this action as “looting a grocery store” whereas a similar 
Agence France-Presse photo of two White people described this action as “finding bread 
and soda from a local grocery store.”160 
 
Picture 4. “Man Looting”161 
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Picture 5. “Finding Food”162 
Mr. Jack Stokes said the Associated Press had guidelines in place before 
Hurricane Katrina struck to distinguish between “looting” and “carrying.” Mr. Stokes 
said that Mr. Martin had seen the man in his photograph wade into a grocery store and 
come out with the sodas and bag, so by AP’s definition, the man had looted. The 
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photographer for Getty Images, Mr. Graythen, said in an e-mail message that he had also 
stuck to what he had seen to write his caption, and had actually given the wording a great 
deal of thought. Mr. Graythen described seeing the couple near a corner store from an 
elevated expressway. The door to the shop was open, and things had floated out to the 
street. He was not able to talk to the couple, “so I had to draw my own conclusions,” he 
said.163 
Despite the plausible reasons given for the titles to each photograph, it is the 
notion that the rationales behind each party’s actions drive the conversation that 
inevitably leads to discussion of race. The perception discerned by people viewing the 
photos will influence their belief system and intrinsically drive their thoughts words and 
actions. These beliefs carry over long after the photo has been discarded and remain as a 
disruptive force in problem solving and providing assistance.  
The final “message” in this section is that a huge gulf exists between White and 
African-American feelings about the crisis and how it was handled with the Whites 
seeing it as more of an unfortunate incident and the minorities seeing it as a devastating 
example of deep structural and institutional inequality. To remedy these problems, the 
admission of a problem must occur first. These problems take the form of underlying 
issues and policy decisions that guide preparedness, response and recovery in 
communities of color. To serve these populations better, emergency management 
practitioners must develop ways to gain trust, encourage meaningful dialogue, and 
ultimately, change the thought process of these individuals in regards to disasters. This 
change comes in the form of engaging in the programs and actions that the government 
has implemented so successfully in less challenged communities. By acknowledging the 
issues present that may cloud judgments and enable perceptions to become reality, open 
and honest communication must be delivered. Once the lines of communication are 
opened, progress then can be made in structures and policies that can bring perceived 
inequities more in line with reality. Until dialogue and candor are present in these  
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conversations, the institutionalization of bias and perception will persist in any future 
crisis situations and a true level of preparedness in these communities will not be 
realized. 
 59
IV. CASE STUDIES 
The previous chapters outlined the issues plaguing emergency response and 
communication in minority communities. These issues have both historical and distinct 
implications with regard to the perceptions and realities of disaster situations, and have a 
demonstrated and long lasting negative effect on these marginalized groups. This chapter 
discusses two projects undertaken in various localities that utilized “grassroots” efforts to 
bridge the divide between government authorities and communities of diverse 
populations. These projects sought to improve disaster preparedness and response by 
increasing communication and seeking input through a “bottom-up” approach.  
Literature on disaster vulnerability indicates that pre-existing socioeconomic 
conditions play a significant role in the ability of individuals and communities to prepare 
for, respond to and cope with disasters.164 According to Bolin, “People’s needs are 
grounded in the nature of their lives before the disaster began; specifically, in their 
employment status, financial resources, social supports, legal entitlements and housing 
situation.”165 Other barriers faced by diverse populations that increase disaster 
vulnerability include: limited or lack of transportation for evacuation, financial resources 
to put together a disaster supply kits or take protective action, and low literacy and the 
related inability to comprehend disaster preparedness materials and warning messages 
fully. For racially and ethnically diverse communities, culture and language serve as 
significant barriers to effective preparedness, response and recovery from disasters.166 
Generally, disadvantaged populations have fewer resources and face a number of 
daily challenges that affect their ability to respond to and recover from an emergency.167 
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Traditional risk communication systems are often designed for the general population, 
which results in marginalized communities having difficulty actually receiving the 
information, understanding the message, and/or trusting the messenger. This population 
is also hard to reach through a traditional risk communication system due to the lack of a 
systematic relationship between government and the organizations from which 
marginalized communities most often receive their services.168 
Crisis is generally defined as “a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or 
series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to 
threaten high priority goals,” including security of life and property or the general 
individual or community well-being.169 Studies of communication have normally been 
regulated to non-dynamic and routine context with little consideration being given to 
emergency communication. Furthermore, the communication needs of racial minorities 
and the poor in crises have received even less attention, even though these populations 
are most often hit the hardest during a crisis.170 Crises are also marked by high levels of 
potential danger (e.g., loss of life) and fast actions by public officials to counteract the 
potential threat of these unanticipated events that throw off the everyday patterns of life. 
Crisis communication aims at preventing or lessening the negative outcomes resulting 
from a crisis. Often, crisis communication has an informative function. Such messages 
encourage the receiver to take some action to avoid a possible threat or harmful effect 
and to create a rational understanding of the risk, a persuasive function.171 
A. CASE STUDY: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEMONSTRATION 
PROJECT 
A capacity building strategy for disaster resiliency achieves a balance between the 
engagement of local people to define needs and external authorities with access to outside 
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resources to meet those needs; expert knowledge and local ordinary knowledge, and 
proposed activities that fit values of underserved populations and accountability to 
broader community goals.172 The purpose of the Emergency Preparedness Demonstration 
(EPD) Project was collaboratively to produce community-based disaster plans tailored to 
meet locally defined vulnerability issues and premised on local capacity to implement the 
plans.173 This project was chosen as it attempted to close the gap in disaster planning 
focused on disadvantaged people and the disparities in resiliency. The effects of this 
project can be utilized as a basis for other programs that serve minority communities and 
build the foundation of increased communication and preparedness. 
In 2004, MDC Inc. and the University of North Carolina (UNC) initiated a 
partnership and engaged in the EDP Project with support from FEMA. MDC has served 
as a mediating institution for over four decades on work that aims to strengthen 
underserved communities and foster relations with external organizations that can infuse 
communities with needed resources and expertise. The university group consisted of a 
core of investigators with expertise in anthropology, public health, and urban planning, 
and considerable experience in hazard vulnerability analyses and disaster planning.174 
Between 2005 and 2008, the MDC/UNC partnership initiated and completed six 
community-based demonstration projects aimed at creating disaster plans and taking 
action to implement prioritized strategies.175 The MDC/UNC partners chose to pursue a 
bottom-up, participatory action research approach to disaster planning based on the 
failures of systems of the past in distressed and diverse communities. 
The Project implemented a planning team in six communities, employed three 
“coaches” to work with the teams, and provided financial support through grants totaling 
$40,000 for each community. The community coaches had experience in community 
engagement and community building in minority communities; however, in most of the 
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related research, no mention was made that any of the coaches had a connection to the 
actual community served. The coaches served as technical advisers, facilitators, and 
catalysts for change, and integrated a diverse mix of skills (communication, consensus 
building, mediating, visioning, technical competence, advocacy) needed to motivate 
collective action and action of the planning teams. The planning teams represented the 
diverse interest of the community, provided historical knowledge about disaster issues, 
and formulated solutions based on their developed priorities.176 
1. Site Selection 
Initially, disadvantaged communities within the 2003 Hurricane Isabel impact 
zone were identified using census data on socio-economic characteristics. Next, staff 
from state divisions of emergency management and FEMA developed and reviewed a 
preliminary list of communities to identify the best candidates based on potential barriers 
and opportunities to working with such communities, and the commitment and capacity 
of communities to participate in the demonstration project. The MDC/UNC team then 
conducted site visits, and included exploratory meetings with a diverse set of local 
representatives in potential communities, to determine the willingness and ability of the 
communities to participate in the Project (Table 4).177 
                                                 





Table 4.   Cities Selected to Participate in EPD Project178 
Table 5 reveals the pattern of results of the determined efforts to enhance 
participation and strengthen networks. Community-based participants were well 
represented by diverse participants at five of the six EPD sites (as noted, Hampshire 
County is the exception). Participation of formal external organizations was mixed as 
local chapters of humanitarian aid organizations (e.g., United Way and Red Cross) were 
active in four of the six sites, but state agencies were active in just Dorchester County and 
Wilmington.179 
                                                 






Table 5.   Most Active Participants on the Emergency Planning Team180 
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A fundamental strategy of the EPD planning process was the work of coaches as 
“relational organizers,” to borrow Warren’s term, in bringing together key participants to 
build trust and agree on a course of action.181 This process built on the concept of 
“bottom-up” trust building by involving key stakeholders from local government and 
service providers who may have had a higher level of trust with community members 
through various projects already underway within the respective communities. The ability 
for the “coaches” to leverage relationships already formed through the routine forces of 
local government were used as a conduit for the discussion on capacity building within 
the community to reduce vulnerability. 
The goals of the coaches were to bridge the divide that existed in these 
communities by building trust in a direct and formal setting. Coaches engaged in 
relational organizing that emphasized face-to-face contact, and minimized disconnected 
and formal means of contact like bulletins, newsletters, email and phone calls. Coaches 
continuously worked at targeting those who had divergent perspectives often defined by 
suspicion and mistrust, and requested them to come together.182 
Building and keeping the trust of marginalized communities has long been an 
unresolved issue for federal, state and local authorities. In this project, coaches provided 
what Sirianni terms “translation services” between the grassroots understanding of 
disaster risks and solutions, and agency cultures that embrace bureaucratic and 
professional norms that reflects how they perceive risks and the efficiency, equity, and 
effectiveness of solutions.183 By explaining the specifics of each other’s concerns and 
drawing all groups together into a collaborative viewpoint, the coaches became viewed as 
trusted sources of information to the communities at large and a helpful facilitator of 
information by the local authorities. Through this creation of mutual trust partnerships, 
commitments by the local governments and civilian stakeholders to work together in a 
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participatory and asset-based approach to serving these communities were achieved. A 
snapshot of programs realized though the EPD project is encapsulated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.   Promising Practices that Extend the Network of Allies184 
2. The Plan 
The EPD projects utilized four steps in their process of engagement and eventual 
capacity building in the participating communities. Recruitment was found to be a 
primary component of the project to obtain the necessary engagement to begin the 
program and energize the participants. It was determined that engagement and 
recruitment are most effective in disadvantaged communities when tailored to the 
strength of local networks and ensure that all relevant stakeholders are engaged early 
on.185 The project’s recruitment focused on personal contact rather than authority relying 
on informal structures of knowledge and reverent power of stakeholders within the 
                                                 




subject communities. These individuals provided the background and knowledge of 
social issues present that would potentially impact the objectives of the program. These 
participants brought credibility to the project and assisted in defining the problems and 
identifying groups of similar “power” and resources that may have been excluded. The 
project’s organizers also indicated that the recruitment strategy was made easier when 
pre-existing social networks were strong, and trust and communication links were high 
and engaged.186 
Step two in the process involved information being developed by the stakeholders 
in the communities. The ability to identify disaster issues and select strategies in concert 
with local authorities created “buy-in” by the local participants. The project 
acknowledges that “while expert driven knowledge is crucial for scientifically sound 
planning, “ordinary knowledge” possessed by local people reflects local conditions and 
values.”187 Reliance on ordinary knowledge reflects the perspectives and abilities of local 
people, and helped develop more accurate information about local vulnerabilities and 
options for solving them.188 The study found that when information was not co-
developed, as in Dorchester County, less opportunity existed to build a sense of 
ownership and commitment to the project, and increased hostility.189 As Israel et al. 
argue, participation is more than just participating. It involves engagement, choice, and 
the possibilities of that choice being acted upon.190  
The third phase of the project utilized the coaches as catalytic agents who offered 
support and planning developing unique processes built to serve the particular 
community. Coaches were accountable first and foremost to the underserved people but 
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also to standards to achieve the broader aims of the EPD project. They provided 
encouragement and guidance when teams were struggling or unclear on how to proceed, 
while serving as intermediaries skilled at building trust.191 Acting as intermediaries, and 
guiding the process, the coaches supported informal webs of communication, 
coordination, mediation, and information exchange to strengthen relationships between 
the subject populations and formal authorities. Their duty was also to identify, engage, 
and access additional resources that the community’s stakeholders could leverage. The 
study identified that when coaching was not followed; collaborative planning was more 
likely to underperform. Despite considerable urging, for example, a coach working in 
Hampshire County was unable to convince the core planning team to expand the diversity 
of participants on the team. Consequently, the team was better geared to work on formal 
organizational networking that did not spill over to grassroots organizing.192 
The study determined that when disaster planning is inclusive and accountable, 
prospects improve in building commitment and capacity essential in implementation and, 
most importantly, fostering sustainable change in relations with underserved 
populations.193 This phase included the realization that a multipronged approach must be 
undertaken to ensure the maintenance of the overarching strategy. Grant funding and 
accountability measures were also suggested as a means to encourage follow through by 
ensuring that the reporting procedures be met and the technical skills obtained via 
financial resources. These additional factors were emphasized to maintain the practices 
established and the partnerships achieved between the local authorities, coaches, and 




                                                 





In sum, the projects’ concepts support the ideal that communities can build power 
and leverage the support inherently present from government authorities. Grassroots 
disaster planning is not premised on a carefully scripted, linear, and orderly process that 
will meet the demands of each and every community. Community-based participatory 
planning is not fail safe despite the best efforts of planning practitioners.194  
EPD’s experiences in strengthening capacity highlights a long-term 
comprehensive approach to this work that focuses on flexible recruitment, recognition of 
experts and local people as equal partners in co-developing information, the role of 
coaches as relational organizers, and accountability that strengthen networks to sustain 
progress.195 An important aspect further discussed in this work is that the difference in 
social makeup and culture between marginalized communities, and the general 
population in regards to disaster vulnerability and self-governance, are immensely 
diverse and “cannot be undone through a single participatory initiative.”196 
B. GRASS ROOTS COMMUNICATION PROJECT: OBSERVATIONS AND 
FINDINGS 
Grassroots organizations are user defined and based on participation from the end 
user in a bottom-up communications method, which allows for participation in problem 
solving and decision making. Research indicates that grassroots organizations, such as 
faith-based and nongovernmental organizations, are effective in addressing community 
needs during a disaster.197 
Using the Hurricane Katrina experience as a backdrop, the GRC Project was 
developed as a continuation of the 2005 Special Population Bioterrorism Initiative 
between Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and Morgan State 
University’s School of Community Health and Policy (MSU SCHP). The GRC Project 
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was designed to assist in upgrading state and local public health jurisdictions’ 
preparedness for and response to bioterrorism, outbreaks of infectious diseases, and other 
public health threats and emergencies. The GRC Project was conducted from June 2006 
through August 2006. 
The first phase consisted of collecting information from low-income minorities, 
mostly African-Americans, to assess further disaster service needs, perceptions about the 
avian flu pandemic, and the impact that Hurricane Katrina had on the community’s 
perceptions about disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Phase 2 consisted of 
meetings with community stakeholders to solicit input to develop and validate 
community participation as a meaningful strategy. This phase determined the 
opportunities and willingness of external organizations to participate in an enhanced 
communication system while developing a means to minimize the distrust of local 
authorities and low access to important information.198 
The Phase One survey explored the impact of Hurricane Katrina among low-
income African-Americans located in Maryland, through indirect exposure to the mass 
media. The survey instrument used scales developed to assess trust/confidence in 
government agencies that consisted of honesty, fiduciary responsibility, competency, and 
confidentiality as related to their perceptions about Hurricane Katrina and its impact on 
their own preparedness. 
The results from the GRC Project demonstrated the potential unstable information 
environment that can develop in low-income communities.199 The perceptions of past 
disasters coupled with distrust and poor information exchange can limit preparedness and 
response information in minority communities that is consistent with other research 
concerning minority groups and disasters. In a study by Hartman and Squires, it was 
noted that many participants felt racism and classism contributed to this problem and that 
low-income minority populations are distrustful of government agencies responsible for 
disaster and other public health services, and that Hurricane Katrina heightened the level 
                                                 




of distrust among minority populations.200 Four focus group sessions were conducted 
from a sub-set of survey participants. A total of 43 African-Americans participated in the 
sessions of which 23 were females and 20 males that while small in number is a 
representation of the concerns by those in the community.201 Participants discussed what 
went wrong with Hurricane Katrina, who was to blame, the lessons learned, and how they 
would respond to risk communication messages. Table 7 provides a description of the 
five themes that emerged from the focus group session discussions. These findings 
suggest a need to engage trusted agencies and leaders in risk communication activities.202 
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Table 7.   Thematic Analysis of Focus Group203 
Phase two of the Project included the development of a Risk Communication 
Team that consisted of a principle investigator, project manager, and a consultant. The 
principal investigator administered the grant while the project manager coordinated 
logistics through all phases of the effort. The project consultant assisted with developing 
the grassroots risk communication system. This phase of the project also involved 
contracting with a grassroots outreach worker (GOW) to assist in coordinating the 
                                                 
203 Rowel et al., “A Guide to Enhance Grassroots Risk Communications Among Low-Income 
Populations.” 
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development of the grassroots system at the local level.204 The GOW was to solicit local 
“grassroots” organizations actively, which would agree to participate in the distribution 
of risk communications. These organizations currently served the pre-determined 
minority populations and were chosen in an attempt to bridge the communication gap 
existing between these populations and local authorities.  
During the three-month strategy development period, the GOW obtained 25 
agreements from faith and community-based leaders and government agencies that 
served low-income minority populations. These grass-roots organizations agreed to be 
the points of distribution for risk-related information before, during, and after a disaster. 
The majority of agreements were signed by faith-based organizations (48%), followed by 
community-based organizations (32%) and city agencies serving low-income populations 
(20%). Most agencies (84%) agreed to disseminate awareness materials (i.e., flyers and 
brochures) before a disaster occurs, and 84% also agreed to disseminate materials during 
the imminent danger phase.205 The intent of this step was to develop providers to 
disseminate information to high-risk groups and secure these providers prior to 
developing the “guide” in the next phase. 
The authors of the guide define a “grassroots risk communication system” as a 
partnership that enables public health and emergency preparedness practitioners to 
involve grassroots organizations, such as faith-based, community-based, and business 
organizations serving low-income populations, in risk communication activities during 
imminent danger (warning), response and recovery phases of disaster.206 This grassroots 
approach is further supported by studies conducted to assess current risk communication 
practices focused on at-risk populations including the one completed in Phase One. Key 
                                                 





findings noted in this study indicated that community-based participation strengthens 
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery for at-risk populations.207 
Generally, disadvantaged populations, such as minorities and low-income 
individuals, have fewer resources and face a number of daily challenges that affect their 
ability to respond to and recover from an emergency.208 “Sound and thoughtful risk 
communication can assist public emergency management and public health practitioners 
in preventing ineffective, fear-driven, and potentially damaging public responses to 
serious crises such as unusual disease outbreaks and bioterrorism.”209 Figure 5 depicts 
the unstable information environment that risks communication systems are designed to 
minimize. This unstable information environment is prevalent among all populations, 
which however, can be exacerbated among low-income populations.210  
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Figure 5.   An Unstable Information Environment211 
                                                 
211 Rowel et al., “A Guide to Enhance Grassroots Risk Communications Among Low-Income 
Populations.” 
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The originators of the guide purport that a system that continuously delivers 
important messages to the community, and particularly vulnerable populations, may 
overcome many of the communication problems that exist among this group. However, 
the development of a grassroots risk communication system requires emergency 
management planners to initiate different activities at each disaster phase including pre-
disaster, imminent danger, response, and recovery periods. 
Traditional risk communication systems are often designed for the general 
population. As a result, marginalized communities that fall below the average literacy 
level may have difficulty understanding the information and/or trusting the messenger. 
This population is also hard to reach through a traditional risk communication system due 
to the lack of a systematic relationship between government and the grassroots 
organizations from which marginalized communities most often receive their services. 
By forming these liaisons, the communication process will improve, and as a by-product, 
create a “stable information environment” (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.   A Stable Information Environment212 
                                                 
212 Rowel et al., “A Guide to Enhance Grassroots Risk Communications Among Low-Income 
Populations.” 
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Based upon meetings with local health department and emergency management 
partners, and on findings from the GRC Project, it was determined that designing a 
grassroots risk communication system must incorporate the following principles. 
 
Figure 7.   Grassroots Communications System Principles 
For the communication system to be effective, it needs to be heavily relied upon 
by grassroots organizations that include community-based, faith-based, and business 
organizations that serve the low-income population in any given neighborhood.213 The 
realization that these organizations and entities have already built trust in underserved 
communities had the intended effect of maximizing communications and enhancing the 
bridge of trust with local officials. The organizers sought to invest in the number and 
types of organizations involved, believing that limiting partnerships to one particular 
category of grassroots organizations may serve to limit outreach opportunities that might 
result in some low-income individuals not receiving the necessary information, and 
consequently, hindering their ability to act. 
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Examples of each type of grassroots or business organization serving low-income 
populations include the following. 
 
Figure 8.   Examples of Grassroots Organizations Serving Minority Populations 
Developing a grassroots risk communication system requires different priorities 
during different phases of disasters. Four basic phases in which risk communication 
activities should occur are: 1) pre-disaster, 2) imminent danger/warning, 3) response, and 
4) recovery. In the analysis of the agency agreements for the GRC Project, 84% of the 
grassroots organizations were willing to disseminate awareness material before a disaster 
occurs and in the imminent danger phase (one week prior), while 96% also showed a 
willingness to display posters or other printed materials at all times.214 
Agency agreement findings also indicated that 28% of the grassroots 
organizations were willing to participate on radio talk shows.215 In addition, grassroots 
organizations should be included on various government list serve groups to stay abreast 
of necessary information and enhance their relationships with government agencies. 
                                                 




Table 8 provides methods in which government agencies can enhance communication 
during the pre-disaster phase by working with grassroots organizations. 
 
Table 8.   Effective Ways for Government to Enhance Pre-Disaster Communication216 
1. Outcomes 
For many low-income populations, a disaster is considered a low probability 
event. Thus, other pressing issues, such as paying bills, family drug abuse, and crime in 
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their communities, may take precedence over becoming aware of disasters or creating an 
emergency preparedness kit.217 The ability to work with grassroots organizations could 
lead to new strategies for preparing low-income populations and building disaster 
resiliency. This ability to build capacity and encourage resiliency would create an 
environment in which individuals can reduce risks, decrease vulnerabilities, and “bounce 
back” quicker to unfortunate events. At the national level, the concept of resilience was 
identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report as one of 
three foundational elements essential to a comprehensive approach to homeland security. 
The report also defines ensuring resilience to disasters as one of five missions of the 
department.218 Effective preparation during the pre-disaster period could serve to lessen 
the impact of an incident if government agencies work with grassroots organizations to 
identify threats and plan to minimize their effects, determine vulnerabilities, and give 
higher priorities to the appropriate interventions while identifying required resources 
available during an incident.219 
The development of the system is not a substitute for existing governmental risk 
communication systems; instead, it serves as a complement to existing systems by 
making them more effective. A grassroots risk communication system also serves to 
diversify sources of information for those who traditionally lack trust in government 
agencies. In addition, establishing and maintaining relationships with organizations that 
work closely with low-income groups will provide additional opportunities for 
government agencies to assess the impact of their messages and materials, and improve 
their quality by making the messages and materials more culturally sensitive. 
During the response and recovery period, grassroots organizations could serve as 
support to those affected and facilitate short- and long-term activities to return to 
normalcy. Some of the grassroots organizations may have resources, such as shelters, 
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food, clothing, etc., which could serve as additional community resources during the 
response or recovery periods. Also, these organizations may be willing to assist in 
organizing evacuation plans by communicating messages and taking leadership roles 
within the community. 
2. Barriers to Implementation of a Grassroots Risk Communication 
System 
In interviews with grassroots organizations,220 most indicated enthusiasm about 
doing public activities. Distribution of the materials to the people they usually meet was 
mentioned as an easy and feasible activity, especially during the imminent danger phase. 
However, one of the major concerns when working with grassroots organizations is the 
sustainability of their services. As such, powerful incentives and ongoing relationships 
with these organizations should be established to ensure sustainability of these voluntary 
services. The grassroots organizations indicated that such incentives from government 
agencies would prove beneficial in keeping the organizations motivated to provide the 
promised services. One particular incentive mentioned included being recognized at 
special events, in newsletters, or on websites. In this regard, regular updating of 
organizational profile data and communicating the organizations’ expectations or 
concerns with government agencies is essential. In addition, it would be helpful for 
government agencies to establish relationships with additional grassroots organizations 
that could serve as backup partners when the main grassroots organizations are not 
available or are not performing as expected. Finally, establishing strong relationships 
with grassroots organization during the pre-disaster period could serve to ensure better 
services from these organizations.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Research studies have concluded that the participation of key stakeholders in 
disaster preparedness and planning will increase participation in emergency preparedness 
and information flow. Organizations that include community representatives drawn from 
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churches, social clubs, schools, or labor unions are assumed to increase communication 
and build trust in marginalized communities. The success of involving churches in 
African-American communities in other public health endeavors buttresses this 
recommendation.221 Ensuring that authorities are viewed as honest requires addressing 
both the completeness of information, as well as its accuracy.222 People are more likely 
to trust authorities whom they view as genuinely concerned about the welfare of 
others.223 
The missing aspect of each of these plans and organizational structures is the 
individual component of being prepared and accepting personal responsibility for 
themselves and their families. The aforementioned cases created an environment like 
many others that creates a “middle man” to connect to the stakeholder/citizen to the 
government authority. These programs emphasize sharing, collecting, and facilitation of 
information to the end user without creating a deliverable that can functionally exist 
without an intermediary. This effort is disconcerting when considering the number of 
people expecting service and the small number of organizations engaged in the process. 
The small numbers of organizations facilitating awareness pale in comparison to those 
actually needing service. While even one more person being prepared is significant, it is 
of much more importance and gravity to stress individual resiliency and enhance the level 
of responsibility at the personal level without reliance on third parties. 
Enabling the end users to facilitate their means of information exchange and 
preventive action will decrease vulnerability, and thereby, increase resiliency. A process 
for direct engagement is discussed in the next chapter whereby individual responsibility 
is highlighted as a means for direct action and trust building to assist in an emergency.  
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The ability to build self-reliance in these communities will not only have a positive effect 
in times of disaster, but also in building self-esteem and confidence that may extend into 
other areas impacting these socioeconomically challenged areas. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the preceding chapters, a condition of perceived distrust by the citizens, and 
abandonment by government officials, led to an atmosphere that has created a drain on 
resources, in that individuals, for a variety of reasons, have not taken the proper steps to 
prepare, and in essence, create a state of resiliency for themselves and their families. This 
condition, along with varying socioeconomic factors, and in some cases apathy, has 
emerged as a lasting foundation of which a construct of helplessness and a general 
disconnect in regards to disaster and emergency response has been formed in these 
communities. By way of two case studies, the actions undertaken in various locations to 
engage these “marginalized” communities using third party grassroots or local 
organizations were evaluated. These programs were specifically designed to build trust 
and communication with intermediaries that would provide information and facilitate 
fundamental processes. 
The research indicates that success in reaching out to these populations through 
these programs has occurred; however, the programs themselves depend on Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs), money, and the interaction with the end user. 
Additionally, a measure or evaluation of success has not been developed to adequately 
assess if these programs are working and what percentages of affected populations are 
actually being reached through these programs. Limited research or information is 
available that places the responsibility for preparedness and active response at the feet of 
the end user. Creating a culture of individual preparedness to empower individuals within 
a segment of the population would be more meaningful and effective in reaching the 
larger group and having lasting effects. 
This chapter discusses recommendations for implementing a program of 
individual preparedness and reliability based on changing the way individuals view their 
level of responsibility to result in self-sustainment and limit the drain on traditional 
resources while increasing relations, creating resilience, and minimizing conflict and 
hostilities based on the perception of racial discrimination. The recommendations put 
forth are to use “positioning theory” to heighten awareness within the African-American 
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community. Harré and Davies developed positioning theory to open up a new dimension 
in the psychology of interpersonal encounters, through explicit attention to the role of 
rights and duties in the management of personal action. People are positioned or position 
themselves to act within evolving story lines, and based on claims about relevant personal 
attributes, the discursive process of prepositioning.224 Positioning theory can clarify how 
parties might reinterpret their roles such that destructive acts can be set aside and acts 
“appropriate to [new] rights and duties are recalibrated.”225 A shift in conversation can 
produce a dramatic shift in negotiating shared meanings. Jessie Sutherland states that 
learning how to engage dynamically across differences to “create shared pictures is a 
critical skill in today’s world.”226 
Scholars believe that positioning theory is a “powerful tool” for understanding 
and resolving conflict, which involves a temporal relationship with a constructed, 
contested social reality.227 “Positioning Theory illuminates how meaning-making 
practices ... lie at the heart of conflict.”228 By establishing an individual position, working 
within the social forces and creating an individual story line, an individual’s place in any 
given situation can become clear. To that extent, a negative situation can turn positive 
with a modification of those elements, and conversely, a positive situation can evolve due 
to changes or conflict. 
The development of a defined position by the head of household will delineate 
this person’s personal responsibility, stimulate preparedness, educational development, 
and increase the value of the individual’s role in preparing and maintaining personal and 
                                                 
224 Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” Theory & Psychology 19, no. 1 
(2009): 5–31. 
225 Daniel Rothbart and Tom Bartlett, “Rwandan Radio Broadcasts and Hutu/Tutsi Positioning,” in 
Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam, Rom Harré, and 
Naomi Lee (New York: Springer, 2008), 227–246. 
226 Jessie Sutherland, Worldview Skills: Transforming Conflict from the Inside Out (Worldview 
Strategies, 2005). 
227 Winnifred R. Louis, “Intergroup Positioning and Power,” in Global Conflict Resolution Through 
Positioning Analysis, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam, Rom Harré, and Naomi Lee (New York: Springer, 2008), 
21–39. 
228 Fathali Moghaddam, Rom Harré and Naomi Lee, “Afterword,” in Global Conflict Resolution 
Through Positioning Analysis, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam, Rom Harré, and Naomi Lee (New York: 
Springer, 2008). 
 87
family safety. Additionally, by using other members of the household, namely children, 
and initiatives within the community, the family’s responsibility will be better defined 
and effective. The proposed action will also use the interaction of government agencies, 
NGOs and FBOs to facilitate this information building and sustainment activity. 
A. POSITIONING THEORY 
Regardless of their intent, people can be barriers to implementation of a new way 
of problem solving.229 The actions or inactions of people can affect the way in which 
change is brought to a community. The ability for individuals to change singularly has a 
greater effect when done collectively, and conversely, can have an even more negative 
effect if actions are used as a barrier to change that also influences the group as a whole. 
Solving problems and true continuous improvement requires people to focus their 
inquisitiveness freely on understanding problems and crafting solutions to address the 
issue. Leaders need to inspire people to make this focused effort and take action to 
accomplish improvements.230 
When considering how to eliminate barriers and enable change to create a more 
dynamic level of personal responsibility for emergency preparedness using positioning 
theory, consideration should be given to the following. 
 Providing a basis to understand parity and power through the discourse 
that unfolds. As an example, an individual taking personal responsibility 
for personal planning raises the level of power and equality. 
 Offering a way to understand the difficulties encountered in the change 
process. By understanding that no easy fix exists, and by assuming 
personal responsibility, value in changing the process can be realized and 
achieved. 
 Demonstrating that interpersonal shortfalls need to be resolved before 
people can move to a new way. Creating a partnership to dispel myths and 
years of distrust will enable open dialogue and a sincere learning 
environment. 
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As a society, individuals are thought to place themselves in positions or mindsets 
that encourage a belief that a certain situation or condition exists based on actions or 
perceptions. Although indeterminateness or ambiguity may persist to some degree, by 
positioning themselves and others within conversations, people can give meaning to their 
behavior and make it intelligible in the light of the story line of the conversation.231  
As evinced in Figure 9, positioning theory is based upon the interconnectedness 
of the following factors. 
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A position is a “loose set of rights and duties that limit the possibilities of 
action,”233 while positioning is the “dynamic construction of personal identities relative 
to those of others.”234 Language is used, differing by context, to position or construct a 
vantage point.235 
According to Boxer, “Positioning is an ever-negotiable definition of self.”236 It is 
through positions that a person’s moral and personal attributes are defined, strengthened, 
or diluted.237 Positions are relational, flexible, and dynamic, and vary to the extent to 
which they are consensual and to which they are intentionally chosen.238,239 Individual 
positioning is formed through actions and experiences that create the foundation of being. 
2. Social Force 
Social force links semantics and human action. “Social force” can be defined as 
what is accomplished socially through conversation and symbolic exchange240 that in 
many respects define the focus of interaction. In considering the application of social 
forces, it can be said that the meaning of words, not words themselves, actually frame the 
conversation and subsequent action or inaction. 
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3. Story Lines 
Stories are “the driving force of human understanding and action” according to 
Pearce and Littlejohn.241 Similar to a script, story lines can be actively constructed and 
contested.242 However, story lines are more open and fluid than scripts, because within 
any one story line, different scripts can evolve. In the story line, people can accept, reject, 
be forced into, be displaced from, and be refused access to positions. People locate 
themselves in stories to feel cohesion and connection. Shared story lines may involve 
“shifts in power, access, or blocking of access, to certain features of claimed or desired 
identity.”243 
These factors could contribute to the emergency preparedness discussion in that 
trusted members of the community could assign duties and responsibilities. In turn, a 
collective among all individuals is created wherein their shared responsibility is viewed 
through one shared lens. By turning their difficulties and conflict into positive energy by 
directing specific roles, a more dynamic and positive shift in duties can be achieved.  
An action becomes socially significant by providing meaning to the unfolding 
conversation.244 How a conversation unfolds depends on all three elements of the 
“positioning triad,” the interplay between positions, story line, and speech-acts.245 A 
change of the story line affects both position and speech-act. The presence or absence of 
certain positions may or may not allow for certain speech-acts; hence, altering the story 
line or not and so forth. It is, therefore, imperative that all aspects of the “positioning 
triad” be consistent and share the same message. Alleviating dissent and distrust are 
important factors in changing the belief systems that have been previously present. 
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The perception that minority populations, and African-American communities, in 
particular, have become marginalized has become a reality and a persistent mindset. The 
“positioning” being assumed is one of helplessness, disconnect, and unfair treatment by 
government authorities, which has resulted in a discourse that has created malaise and 
distrust in government action causing further inaction by these affected communities. As 
a group, a general “position” has been assumed that fewer services are available to these 
communities, and therefore, they will suffer in comparison to other more affluent and 
racially non-diverse areas. By changing the position, speech actions and story line, the 
individuals in the community can begin to place themselves in the conversation and the 
discourse of distrust can be altered to one of personal responsibility that leads to 
empowerment, developing into action, and eventually, garnering the trust that is so 
lacking.  
“Positions” are features of the local moral landscape. People are assigned 
positions, or acquire, or even seize positions via a variety of prior implicit and explicit 
acts that, in the most overtly “rational” positioning acts, are based on personal 
characteristics, real or imaginary.246 The positions that individuals place themselves in 
are built on experiences and influenced by patterns seen and heard, and may sometimes 
be built on erroneous or inconclusive facts. Despite the veracity of the experiences and 
perceptions, individuals living in their position, which may be ascribed to a negative 
event, can overcome this disposition and change the landscape of their situation. 
This change can be achieved because positioning practices vary with 1) the 
particular cultural ideals persons desire to move toward through positioning, 2) the 
particular dimensions that persons find relevant in positioning themselves and others in 
discourse, and 3) with the preferred forms of autobiographic telling, which may influence 
the types of stories people tell themselves about themselves in the process of 
positioning.247 If through shared experiences or individual desire, an individual chooses  
 
                                                 
246 Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” 5–31. 
247 Siu Lan Tan and Fatahli M. Moghaddam, “Reflexive Positioning and Culture,” Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour 25, no. 4 (1995): 387–400. 
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to change a position and assume a role and duty not previously ascribed to this person’s 
discourse, the position changes, speech-acts begin to evolve, and the story line becomes 
different. 
B. STRATEGY 
1. Changing An Individual’s Position 
By recognizing that roles and duties can be changed within an individual’s 
position, recommendations for creating those factors are discussed to improve 
preparedness and response to disaster events. A three-pronged effort is suggested to 
change the focus, level of responsibility, and eventually, the belief system of those in 
minority communities. The degree of change is personally defined and quantified by the 
level of participation by the individual as self, and by the community, as a whole. The 
three areas of change advocated by the author are 1) increasin personal responsibility, 
which is guided and informed, and not supplanted, by NGOs and FBOs, 2) utilizing 
children’s programs to reach family units, and 3) creating subgroups within the 
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program in individual communities to 
share common experiences and provide identity and a like “story-line” for its 
participants. 
The formation of networks is one of the most commonly considered strategies for 
addressing a collective human (community) need that can also support integrated 
strategies. Networks offer opportunity to build social capital, which in turn, creates 
collective value and a commitment to work together. Social capital facilitates information 
flow, mutual aid, and collective action foundational for community resiliency. 
Community resiliency can be improved via the strategy of increasing community 
protective factors (assets) and decreasing risk factors before disaster strikes. Emergency 
management capacity should be built from the ground up by utilizing neighborhood and 
community-based programs to create personal responsibility for individuals and families 
who may have to stand on their own because assistance may not arrive for hours or days, 
which will increase individual and community responsibility for risk reduction and less 
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reliance upon state and federal assistance.248 Research has shown that community 
members included in the planning process and who build trust in a collective 
environment will be more aware of the dangers they will confront, will be more likely to 
respond to guidance consistent with the plan because they understand it better, will have 
greater trust in it, and will feel a level of ownership of the plan.249 What is different about 
these recommendations to effectuate change is the manner in how they are achieved. 
Several key components are required for effective community mobilization to 
occur that include creating a shared vision, a common understanding of the problem, 
leadership, establishing collaborative partnerships, and increased community 
participation and sustainability.250 A critical element in both community capacity 
building and mobilization is the leadership required to bring the key community players 
together, to capture their imagination, and to energize them to action. Such leadership in 
community capacity building need not come from established hierarchies, but can emerge 
from the community itself. Several studies concluded that the response operations by the 
faith-based initiatives and volunteer organizations were much faster and effective 
compared to the federal government’s responses in implementing the new ideas and 
concepts, as well as establishing trust and buy-in from the intended audience.251 Under 
this proposal, it is recommended that these entities be leveraged to create policy, 
encourage buy-in, and incentivize the community at large to “be prepared,” and take the 
focal point of emergency preparedness inside their homes.  
To accomplish this goal, the government must be on the outside looking in and 
provide guidance through officials given the resources and authority to make this change. 
The PPD-8 and “whole community” documents put forth do not speak to the 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and resource driven needs of these underserved communities. 
These documents are written in one-size fits all manner that does not encourage an 
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African-American single mother to create her own “narrative” or story line in regards to 
emergency preparedness. By funding, empowering, and developing independent offices 
that focus on emergency management within underserved communities, the federal 
government could outreach to these groups and encourage individual change. 
The initial groups educated and encouraged to begin the process of changing story 
lines by way of education and development to build personal growth in community 
members should be comprised of organizations that have an intimate relationship with the 
stakeholders being targeted. Government authorities should draw from neighborhood 
watch groups, homeowners’ associations, the business community, and faith-based 
organizations. Each of these organizations represents a vital component to the process by 
having the ability to outreach to their respective communities and knowing the intricacies 
of their respective areas. In particular, the faith-based organizations have the ability to 
reach a large number of individuals on a consistent basis. Psychologists dealing with 
survivors of Hurricane Katrina acknowledged the level of religiosity and realized how 
vital the African-American churches’ role can be in disaster preparedness and 
response.252 The recruitment of religious organizations in the emergency management 
process will assist in enlisting members of the community through trust and rapport 
building. 
The inclusion of a variety of groups is important as studies have shown that 
conflict between minority communities and local agencies and governments, particularly 
involving law enforcement, restrict the lines of communication between vulnerable 
populations and those charged with providing emergency relief. Diminished social and 
resource capital for institutions serving minority populations extend to an institutional 
level and correlate between social capital, race and ethnicity.253 These social forces 
coincide with the individual’s position and work to form the triangle that eventually 
creates the “story line” resulting in a feeling of victimization.  
                                                 
252 Trader-Leigh “Understanding the Role of African-American Churches and Clergy in Community 
Crisis Response.” 
253 Moore, “Institutional Barriers to Resilience in Minority Communities,” 1–8. 
 95
The goal of these community units will be to initiate contact with individuals 
within their communities vulnerable to disaster and provide guidance in line with 
community needs to build both personal and community resiliency. According to Kulig, 
the first component of community resiliency includes evidence of getting along, a sense 
of belonging, and networks. The second component derives from the first and includes a 
sense of community, both in mentality and outlook (hope, spirit). The third component is 
a combination of the first two into a community cohesiveness necessary for collective 
action, specifically, that action of coping, problem solving, and recovery.254 
This “community mobilization effort” will utilize Kulig’s Community Resiliency 
Models to mold a program that can build a level of trust and respect between the 
members, and eventually, the local government body.255 
Effectiveness is achieved when the organizations from different sectors interact 
with one another prior to a disaster. Pre-disaster communication is a key aspect of truly 
effective community preparedness and response (Figure 10).256 
 
Figure 10.   Pre-Disaster Communication Flow257 
                                                 
254 Jennison, “Networking to Improve Community Resiliency in Disaster Planning,” 338–352.  
255 Ibid. 
256 Kapucu, “Collaborative Emergency Management: Better Community Organising, Better Public 
Preparedness and Response,” 239–262. 
257 Ibid. 
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In this portion of the proposed strategy, local authorities working with the groups 
previously described will attempt to reach members of their community through common 
and ordinary interactions. Upon doing so, a detailed and designed interaction toward the 
agenda of preparedness will be provided to the individuals for personal implementation. 
Various entities, such as FEMA and the local government authority, will provide the 
materials utilized for the effort. 
Both the community provider and the government authority should maintain a 
schedule of distributions, talks and activities to enable successful follow through for 
additional services, information, and coordination of events designed to bridge the trust 
and communication gap between the end user and the providers. 
Follow-up via emergency service registrations, participation in civic programs 
and basic knowledge of readiness will be indicators that the affected population is ready 
and able to prepare for and sustain themselves in an emergency. Continual advisement by 
the community providers will enhance this effort, and through partnerships with the local 
government authority, which can be accomplished by community events and 
teambuilding exercises in which it is demonstrated that as a collective, the authorities, 
providers and individuals can work together toward a common goal, and a more prepared 
community and individual. 
These activities can take the form of CERT activations in smaller more defined 
communities in which individuals can become part of a more inclusive group of people 
who share the same needs and issues. Faith-based organizations and the business 
communities can foster preparedness by initiating “build an emergency kit” drives and by 
offering incentives to their members who display a commitment toward preparedness 
both at home and in their community. 
2. Building the Future Through Children 
While strategies geared toward involvement and motivating adults and heads of 
households to change their “story lines” is an important and effective means of engaging 
stakeholders in preparedness, children are also a viable untapped resource who can have 
both immediate and future long-term effects. Children’s intellect and life skills begin 
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formation during their early school years. Influences created by their environment and 
experiences will shape many of their adult processes and also influence patterns at home. 
Children can be an influence in the home and through education. It is recommended that 
an intense effort be utilized to educate children and provide resources to enable a learning 
environment about preparedness, and to also be a means of influencing and empowering 
the entire family unit. According to Dunst et al., family empowerment means, “the ability 
of families to manage life events effectively as well as gain mastery over their affairs 
requires that we empower families to become competent and capable rather than 
dependent upon professional helpers. This is accomplished by creating opportunities for 
families to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to be come stronger and better 
able to manage and negotiate the many demands and forces that impinge upon the family 
unit in a way that promotes individual and family well-being.”258 Viable parent-child 
feedback arrangements are based on a context in which mutually supportive inter-actions 
have been established. When parents and children communicate with each other regularly 
in responsive ways, they perceive feedback as a valuable part of their growth and 
development.259 
a. Starting in the Schools 
The manner suggested to facilitate some of this feedback is through an 
extensive emergency preparedness program geared toward children. Efforts to place 
preparedness programs in schools must be followed through to educate and develop 
processes for children and adolescents to begin acquiring personal responsibility that they 
can transfer into adulthood and bring into their homes. In 2010, FEMA commissioned a 
study to identify research and evaluations of youth education interventions for emergency 
preparedness to use the findings to develop recommendations that can be used to assess 
current programs and to enhance the provision of youth preparedness education 
                                                 
258 C. J. Dunst, C. Trivetle, and A. Deal, Enabling and Empowering Families: Principles and 
Guidelines for Practices (Cambridge, MA: Brookline Books, Inc., 1988). 
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programs.260 The study determined that at the end of the 20th century, an estimated 66.5 
million children each year were affected by a disaster and that the number is likely to 
increase.261 Despite this vulnerability, however, scant attention has been given to this 
particular population in emergency preparedness and planning. Both researchers and 
practitioners have traditionally overlooked children’s needs and experiences in disasters, 
along with their role in disaster preparedness education and training.262 Of particular 
relevance is the correlation of the need of a preparedness curriculum with lessons 
currently taught regarding fire safety. Studies have shown that appropriate educational 
programs can help reduce the risk of childhood burn injuries. Additionally, according to 
Corrarino, Walsh, and Nadel, while minority populations are less likely to take 
preventative measures against childhood burns as compared to their white counterparts, 
proper education and training could cause behavioral change to be more likely within 
these particular groups.263 
Based on this information, the recommendation is to develop a curriculum 
for emergency preparedness in low-income and minority communities centered on 
empirical data taken from actual disaster situations, such as Hurricane Katrina, and 
applying lessons learned so that they become “lessons taught.” Instituting this curriculum 
at the elementary level will foster empowerment and knowledge that can be taken into the 
home and will begin the trappings of a properly educated, trained, and ready next 
generation sure to encounter natural disasters. 
The Citizen Corps, which is a program that provides training for the 
civilian population of the United States to assist in the recovery after a disaster or terrorist 
attack, …has developed a comprehensive catalog of resources for programs related to 
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youth preparedness. The solution is simple, just do it. What needs to be done is to create a 
team that can develop and implement a curriculum to be used regionally to educate and 
prepare for an “all hazards” approach. The panel can consist of emergency managers, 
NGOs, and educators that will develop the curriculum that could be taught during 
National Preparedness Month in September. This mandatory curriculum should tie in 
incentives for the family through private/public partnerships and build on the individual 
responsibility theme described previously. This curriculum cannot be a one size fits all, 
however. Buy-in and development must contain not only the attributes that are present in 
all communities, but include unique factors present in the local community as well or the 
effort will fail. 
b. Using Technology to Reinforce School Lessons 
As a supplement to the in-class curriculum, a Smartphone application 
should be designed for kids. Currently, the FEMA application is adult based and rather 
mundane. The creation of a working game, such as an age appropriate application for 
kids, could supplement the classroom learning and reinforce the teaching methods 
utilized in school. According to Flurry, an Internet consultancy, using apps to play games 
and visit social networking sites comprised 79% of a users’ time (Figure 11).264 This 
graphic screams “consumption,” accessing and using media, and playing games.265  
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Figure 11.   What Apps Are People Using?266 
Additionally, it has been determined that African-American children ages 
8 to 14 are exposed to about 13.5 hours of recreational media each day, Hispanic children 
more than 12.5, and White children about 8.5. These number show a difference of five 
hours of media exposure per day between Black and White children. These differences 
are not new; over the past five years, a steady increase has occurred in media exposure 
for all children, but especially, for Black and Hispanic youth exposed to media sources 
more than one hour more than White youth (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.   Participation in Media Activity by Race Children Ages 0–5267 
Once lower-income and ethnic-minority families own a given technology, 
their children are just as likely to use it, if not more so. Across every digital platform, it 
has been found that Black and Hispanic children use far more media than White children 
(Figure 13). 
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Figure 13.   Total Media Exposure by Race268 
Continuing a trend first identified in 2009, nearly two-thirds of African-
Americans (64%) and Latinos (63%) are wireless Internet users, and minority Americans 
are significantly more likely to own a cell phone than are their White counterparts. 
Additionally, Black and Latino cell phone owners take advantage of a much wider array 
of their phones’ data functions compared to White cell phone owners.269 On average, 
White cell phone owners use 3.8 of the 13 activities measured, while Black cell owners  
 
 
                                                 
268 Gutnick et al., Always Connected: The New Digital Media Habits of Young Children. 
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use an average of 5.4, and English-speaking Latinos use an average of 5.8 non-voice data 
applications.270 In total, phone application use has steadily increased since 2009 (Figure 
14). 
 
Figure 14.   Number of Cellular Phone Applications Downloaded271 
Based on the above, it can be surmised that the use of educational apps 
can reinforce what children are already learning in school and at home. As identified in 
this document, these technological resources can support increased education in the area 
of preparedness and change the narratives in minority communities. Some parents in the 
Learning Study reported that they would reinforce the vocabulary words from the app in 
other real life situations, or that their child would talk about the app when they saw the 
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related television show or characters in another setting272 Thus, the learning opportunities 
for educational media producers may lie beyond just the app itself. The studies reported 
in this thesis suggest the power of apps as a supplemental tool, especially if the content is 
linked to other curriculum or situated learning that continues at home or in school.273 By 
designing content focused on emergency preparedness, it becomes relevant to what the 
child is already learning. Parents in a Learning Study reported that they and their child 
would refer back to the materials in the app when they encountered similar content in 
another situation. Linking the content of newly developed apps to common early learning 
content domains or to seasonal themes, for example, might help reinforce adult-child 
interactions that will advance situated learning in school or in everyday life.274 
A preparedness app should be fun and engaging while balancing the need 
to learn and pair lessons developed in a school setting. As reported in the Learning Study, 
the popular features were ones that were humorous and fun. Humor can capture 
children’s attention and limit unnecessary waiting time. This principle builds on the time-
tested elements pioneered by Sesame Street and other iconic educational media.275 
Additional considerations should be given to duration of use, providing goals and 
incentives, utilizing teamwork, creating scoring or achievement levels to empower the 
user, and engaging multiplayer/subscribers to maintain interest. Lastly, creating a story 
line that is interesting while being beneficial is critical; after all, the primary focus is to 
change the narrative through providing a story line needed for change. 
Most importantly, a Smartphone application must involve parents. The 
ability to nurture the lessons learned in school, form positive behaviors leading to 
positive actions, and ultimately, galvanizing the family unit to self-sufficiency and 
responsibility is the goal. Developers should create apps that children of the same or 
differing ages can play together or with their parents in either co-located or remote and/or 
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asynchronous situations.276 Prompts and introductory tasks for parents embedded in apps 
would not only motivate kids to keep playing, but would help parents see firsthand that 
the app is beneficial for their child.277 Personalization, such as being able to name tasks, 
places or activities, can also assist in creating an identity for the users and further develop 
their social forces and story lines that change their narratives. 
Based on this information, it is recommended that a dynamic and through 
process be developed to incorporate in-class education and technological advances to 
encourage and educate children about emergency preparedness. This process will not 
only benefit the child now and in the future, but has the potential to change practices and 
modify attitudes within the family home in terms of preparedness.  
Targeted school events can also be an important tool in educating children. 
According to a 2010 FEMA study, the schools in the island nation of Grenada hold a 
“National Disaster Awareness Week Primary School Quiz” competition that allows 
children the opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge of hazards and disaster 
management.278 Morris and Edwards found that the island of Jamaica holds “hazard 
awareness days” twice a year that have eventually been included on their schools’ official 
calendars in which schools prepare months in advance for these days, and create lesson 
plans and activities for children.279 South Africa hosts school competitions on The 
International Day for Disaster Reduction at which children demonstrate their knowledge 
of disaster risk reduction through drama, art, and music.280 If these countries see the 
importance of preparedness at the school age level, why is a more concerted effort not 
being undertaken in the United States?  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has described the issues plaguing minority communities within the 
United States related to the effects of disaster. It documents the distrust, lack of 
communication and reasons why those in minority communities fail to plan and in return 
plan to fail. The reasoning behind this issue have been documented through use of 
surveys, anecdotal information, and from interviews by those most affected. Contrasting 
points of view as to why the perception of marginalization exists, or even if it does at all, 
has also been provided for further discussion. In sum, the analysis indicates that 
significant issues do exist within these communities collectively, and with the system as a 
whole.  
The ability to look at the dynamics of what “went wrong” in Hurricane Katrina 
should enable policy makers to realize that change is needed. The perceptions felt by 
those most affected do become reality, and unless outreach is conducted, and those in 
underserved communities feel as if they matter, the missteps of the past are sure to be 
repeated. The realization that the perception of racism is believed to influence the 
decision-making process during emergencies becomes a grim reality of how individuals 
will react in the future. To provide solutions, meaningful dialogue must be developed 
with persons who have influence in minority communities and can sow the seeds of 
cooperation. 
In reviewing the case study examples in Chapter IV, the aspect of involving 
others in the community at a grassroots level has proven to be effective. The issue 
remains, however, if these small groups are actually being effective in reaching the larger 
portion of those needing attention and education. To be successful, consideration should 
be given to a complete overhaul of how minority communities and emergency 
management are viewed. Specifically addressing the underlying problems in these 
communities that center around economics, education and other social factors, is what 
needs to occur before any real change can be made. To accomplish this goal, government 
officials must relinquish control and place authority in the hands of local partners who 
can reach those community members. 
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Upon identifying these individuals, the road to changing narratives and story lines 
must occur. Defining the position of not only self, but also the family unit, will become 
the social force that changes the way units within these communities prepare and 
eventually respond in disaster. It is only after these individuals realize that they hold their 
own destiny will they realize that they are part of the “whole community” and have 
achieved a level of trust in the government that is on the periphery of providing this 
change in their community through trusted leaders, but more importantly, themselves. 
Once this change is realized, the individual’s position evolves into self-reliance. In 
advocating in this change of position, the use of every member of the unit, including 
children, must be utilized. By creating change in children using education programs and 
technological advances, communities are not only changing for the present but for 
generations to come. The leaders in emergency management fields cannot ignore the 
symptoms that have been increasing through each disaster. To improve, lessons learned 
from the past must be brought to the forefront, analyzed, and utilized to create change. 
The “whole community” concept while worthwhile is limited in scope because it does 
focus on the “whole community.” The problem is this nation is not a whole community. 
As has been documented, it is whole in one sense that everyone is an American, and 
holistically different in that as citizens, come from different backgrounds, cultures, trust 
levels, and socioeconomic factors that influence an individual’s being. Until those 
responsible for these policies realize this concept, documents will continue to be 
produced that in the 32 pages of the December 2011 publication, “A Whole Community 
Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action,” 
only include the word “minority” twice. The lens from which those responsible for 
preparedness and response must change to realize the positive effect desired, but more 
importantly, needed in communities in which the stakeholders do not necessarily 
resemble the creators of documents and policies. Small steps have been taken through 




A concentrated effort needs to occur to reach the root of the problem utilizing the 
volumes of research compiled in respect to disaster effects in minority communities. This 
data must then be utilized to form the basis of a true call to action based on the 
underlying issues; a call that is specific and focuses on the heart of the problem affecting 
these communities that have unique issues and perceptions that a “one size fits all” policy 
cannot fix. This type of effort would begin to engender trust and communication that 
would enable lasting foundations to be built. Additionally, creating specific programs for 
children of these communities and making them a priority will not only shape the 
immediate response to disaster but empower and mold a future generation who will know 
what preparedness looks like and how to be self sufficient. 
In this day and age, in which individuals are reluctant to establish specifics for 
one segment of the population over another, this situation is different. Through a set of 
circumstances, these “marginalized communities” have already been treated different, at 
least in their perceptions. Based on these perceptions, their narratives have been created 
that have negatively impacted their story lines, and consequently, their lack of 
preparedness and created a feeling of discrimination. It is now time to effectuate change 
and empower these community members to action by changing their stories, changing 
their outlook on government, and creating a society of inclusiveness and an actual “whole 
community.”  
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